专利池许可最新实践的反垄断法思考

Antitrust Reflections on Recent Practices of Patent Pool Licensing

在技术标准语境下,专利池许可有助于解决因权利碎片化而产生的“反公地悲剧”问题。专利池许可具备“专利许可”和“潜在竞争对手合作”的性质,其可能带来与共谋或知识产权许可限制相关的反垄断问题。“禁止专利权人同时加入竞争性专利池”能够防止搭便车行为并提高标准必要专利许可的效率。可能包含非必要专利的专利池是否排除了替代技术之间的竞争或构成非法搭售,取决于被证明的经济效果。专利池运营者的价格歧视行为不当然违法,除非价格歧视限制了具有横向关系的主体之间的竞争。当许可费占下游产品、服务价格的比例很小时,价格歧视通常不会产生竞争损害。应当要求具有市场支配地位的专利池运营者制定和执行程序性规则,防止其明显而无正当理由地歧视部分专利权人。

In the context of technical standards,pool licensing helps address the problem of“the tragedy of the anticommons”resulting from the fragmentation of rights.Since pool licensing has the characteristics of patent licensing and collaborations among would-be competitors,antitrust issues regarding collusion and restraints in intellectual property licenses can arise.Prohibiting patentees from participating in competing pools simultaneously can prevent free-riding problems and improve the efficiency of standard-essential patent licensing.Whether a patent pool that may include non-essential patents excludes competition between alternative technologies or constitutes illegal tying depends on the demonstrated economic effects.Price discrimination by a patent pool operator is not per se unlawful unless it precludes competition among entities in a horizontal relationship.When royalties account for a small portion of the downstream price,price discrimination is unlikely to raise competitive concerns.Patent pool operators with a dominant position in the pooling market should be required to establish and implement mandatory procedural rules to prevent them from obviously and unjustifiably discriminating against some patentees.