国家审计抑制了社会审计意见购买吗——基于央企控股上市公司的经验证据

Does National Audit Inhibit Social Audit Opinion Shopping:Based on the Empirical Evidence of Listed Companies Controlled by Central Enterprises

审计意见购买行为降低了社会审计质量,损害了社会审计的投资者保护功能。本文以2010—2018年央企控股上市公司为样本,探讨了国家审计对社会审计意见购买的影响及其作用机制,研究发现,央企控股上市公司存在签字注册会计师层面的社会审计意见购买行为,而国家审计能够抑制这一行为。机制检验发现,国家审计通过提高信息透明度和约束管理层权力抑制了央企控股上市公司的社会审计意见购买行为。进一步研究发现,在审计客户重要性程度高、事务所行业专长水平低的情况下,国家审计更能显著地抑制审计意见购买;多次审计以及审计机关查出问题数量越多,国家审计抑制社会审计意见购买的效应越明显;国家审计对社会审计意见购买行为的影响在同行业和具有共同签字注册会计师的未被审计央企控股上市公司中具有溢出效应。本文研究为完善国有企业现代化治理体系、净化注册会计师行业生态环境提供了有价值的参考。

Audit opinion shopping damages the social audit quality and harms the investor protection function of social audit.Taking a sample of listed companies controlled by central state-owned enterprises from 2010 to 2018,this paper discusses the influence of national audit on social audit opinion shopping and its mechanism.The results show that social audit opinion shopping at the signed CPA level exists in listed companies controlled by central state-owned enterprises,which can be inhibited by national audit.The results of the mechanism tests indicate that national audit inhibits social audit opinion shopping by improving information transparency and restricting management power.Further study finds that national audit is well able to inhibit audit opinion shopping when the importance level of the audit client is high and the firm's industry expertise level is low;the higher the number of audit times or the number of problems in the audit announcement,the more significant the inhibition effect of national audit,and the influence of national audit on audit opinion shopping has spillover effects among listed companies controlled by unaudited central state-owned enterprises in the same industry and with common auditors.The research provides a valuable reference for strengthening the modern governance system of state-owned enterprises and purifying the ecological environment of the CPA industry.