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需求不确定下高耗水企业节水服务外包决策研究

Water Saving Service Outsourcing for High Water Consumption Enterprises under Demand Uncertainty
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摘要 将市场节水能力与需求及供应商运营成本视为不确定变量,研究了由一个高耗水企业和两个竞争节水服务供应商组成的服务供应链中,企业的节水服务采购合同逆向拍卖及节水服务公司的能力投资问题。考虑供应商成本信息不对称及存在第三方外部市场,建立了多阶段动态博弈模型。探讨了节水能力与需求不确定下,用户的最优外包策略、供应商的投标报价及节水能力投资决策。进一步,通过数值仿真分析了相关参数对各博弈方决策的影响。研究表明,客户发布的外包量与平均需求、运营成本变异系数及二次采购价格正相关,与需求的标准差、服务价格及平均成本负相关;供应商的投标报价与平均需求、服务价格、平均成本及二次采购价格正相关,与需求的标准差和成本变异系数负相关;中标供应商的节水能力投资与平均需求及二次采购价格正相关,与需求的标准差负相关。此外,无论中标与否,供应商的能力投资都与服务价格正相关,与运营成本负相关。 Water saving service outsourcing has become an important means to construct water-saving enterprises for high water consumption manufacturers which cannot apply required water economizing equipment,technologies and management skills.Manufacturers with water-saving demands often select a specialized water saving service(WSS)provider through procurement bidding to carry out projects for water conservation transformation in production process.Then the industry standard will be reached under the service providers'investment in improving efficiency of water saving and emission reduction.In reality,especially for emerging industries,there broadly exist information asymmetry and market uncertainty.When the actual requirement of customer exceeds the announced outsourcing capabilities,the remaining ones need to be obtained through a second purchase(short-term)contract.In this paper,the reverse auction of client firm's water-saving service procurement contract and the capacity investment of water-saving service companies in a supply chain composed of a high water consumption enterprise and two competing water-saving service providers is considered.And the optimal outsourcing strategy of water user and the decisions on bidding price and investment in water saving capacity of service providers are studied respectively based on a four-stage dynamic game model,in which the unit operation costs of water saving service companies are their private information.Besides,the costs and the market demands are all regarded as independent uncertain variables.After that,the optimal solutions of game participants are derived by backward recursion method.That is,the announced outsourcing capacity of the client,the quoted prices of service providers in the bidding competition and vendors'capacity investment decisions are calculated.Owing to the complicated forms of the solutions,numerical studies are given to examine the impacts of various parameters,such as the client firm's demand distribution,the vendors'cost distributions,the third-party service price and the second purchase price on the optimal decisions of the players.Based on the discussions,it is obtained that the announced outsourcing capacity by water client is positively related to the average actual demand,the coefficient of variation of operation cost and the second purchase price,and negatively related to the standard deviation of demand,service price and average cost;The bidding prices of service suppliers are positively related to the average actual demand,service price,average cost and second purchase price,and negatively related to the standard deviation of cost and the coefficient of variation of actual demand;The investment of water saving capacity of the winning vendor is positively related to the average demand and the second purchase price,and negatively related to the standard deviation of the demand.In addition,whether winning the bid or not,the capacity investment of the vendor is positively related to the service price and negatively related to the operation cost.
作者 李晓娜 马卫民 Li Xiaona;Ma Weimin(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China;School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2024年第8期230-240,共11页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(20BGL115)。
关键词 节水服务外包 逆向拍卖 信息不对称 博弈模型 不确定变量 water saving service outsourcing reverse auction asymmetric information game model uncertain variable
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