非国有股东治理与国有企业职工劳动收入份额——兼论混合所有制改革中的要素收入分配

Governance of Non-State Shareholders and Labor Income Share of Soes:A Concurrent Discussion on Factor Income Distribution in China's Mixed Ownership Reform

提升劳动收入份额是优化要素收入分配结构、实现共同富裕的重要基础。利用2008—2019年国有上市公司数据,本文实证检验非国有股东治理对职工劳动收入份额的影响。研究发现,非国有股东治理能提高国有企业职工劳动收入份额,且主要体现在竞争性行业国有企业中。机制检验显示,非国有股东治理降低了平均资本成本和政策性负担,并提升了劳动力素质。具体表现为降低债务成本和冗员程度,提高高层次人才数量。异质性检验表明,这一作用在地方国企、资本密集型企业和劳动保护力度较高地区的国企中更为明显,其中民营股东发挥了主要作用。研究为混合所有制改革在微观层面的收入分配效应提供经验证据,有利于为进一步探索深化国有企业改革,缓解要素收入分配矛盾提供启示。

Increasing the share of labor income is an important basis for optimizing the distribution structure of factor income and realizing common prosperity.Based on the data of state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2019,this paper empirically examines the impact of governance of non-state shareholders on labor income share.It is found that governance of non-state shareholders significantly increase the labor income share of state-owned listed companies,and this effect is more obvious in competitive industries.The mechanism test shows that the governance of non-state-owned shareholders reduces the average capital cost and policy burden of state-owned enterprises,and improves the quality of labor force.The specific performance is to reduce the cost of debt and redundant employee,and increase the number of high-level talents.Heterogeneity test shows that this effect is more obvious in local state-owned enterprise,capital-intensive enterprises and enterprises in areas with high labor protection,in which private shareholders play a major role.This study provides empirical evidence for the effect of mixed ownership reform on income distribution at the micro level,and provides enlightenment for further deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises and alleviating the contradiction of factor income distribution.