流域水污染协同治理的机制设计及演化路径分析——以新安江流域为例

Research on mechanism design and evolution path for synergistic governance of water pollution in watersheds:a case study of the Xin'an River Basin

为探寻流域水污染协同治理的生成逻辑和演化路径,采用协同学和演化博弈理论,建立两方联合和三方演化博弈模型,并通过稳定性分析明确系统均衡状态;仿真分析新安江流域横向生态补偿及该流域杭州-黄山市水污染治理案例,廓清协同治理作用路径和实现策略。研究发现:流域水污染协同治理蕴含属地治理和府际治理的统一,横纵向多主体协同治理的核心外部因素是引入中央政府积极督察;中央政府督察需结合不同博弈主体收益成本变动和不同博弈阶段,适时调整投入规模和督察力度,两方属地治理督察力度不宜过低,三方府际治理督察力度应适时下降;排污权交易和双向生态补偿-奖惩机制一定程度上可提升博弈主体治污动力,推动水污染积极治理行为实现,但案例中二者涉及子要素投入比例仍需优化。

The objective of this paper is to investigate the underlying principles and evolutionary trajectory of synergistic governance for water pollution in watersheds.Through this study,we aim to establish a clear understanding of the two-party joint and three-party evolutionary game models,as well as analyze the stability of the corresponding equilibrium state within the system.These models and analyses are built upon the theories of synergistic and evolutionary games.By simulating and analyzing the case of horizontal ecological compensation in the Xin'an River Basin and water pollution control in Hangzhou-Huangshan City,which falls within the jurisdiction of this basin,this study outlines the role path and realization strategy of synergistic management.The study reveals that:Firstly,the integrated water pollution control in the watershed requires cohesive territorial and intergovernmental management,where the amalgamation of sewage rights trading and ecological compensation mechanisms complements the evolving trajectory.Secondly,a pivotal external catalyst for the integrated governance involving multiple horizontal and vertical entities is the central government's proactive oversight.This oversight necessitates alignment with shifts in the benefits and costs among the key players,enabling adjustments to the input proportions and scale of operations as required.Central government inspectors must calibrate their inspection strategies to align with distinct stages of the governance process.This entails maintaining adequate inspection intensity for two-party territorial governance,while gradually reducing the intensity for three-party intergovernmental governance.This approach aims to optimize the efficacy of horizontal ecological compensation and other regulatory instruments within the market.In conclusion,our findings demonstrate that emissions trading and a two-way ecological compensation-reward and punishment mechanism can effectively incentivize the key players to mitigate pollution and encourage proactive governance behaviors in water pollution control.However,further optimization of the input proportions for the sub-factors in both cases is necessary.These results enrich the theoretical research in water pollution control and offer valuable insights for government regulatory decision-making.