供应链成员部分持股对制造商创新投资的影响研究

The Effects of Supply Chain Member′s Partial Holding on Manufacturer′s Innovation Investment

基于制造商和零售商构成的两级供应链结构,运用博弈论方法,分析制造商和零售商之间的部分持股对制造商流程创新投资及供应链绩效的影响。通过对比不存在持股与存在持股时的均衡结果,进一步分析部分持股对供应链成员带来的价值。研究结果表明:在制造商不实施流程创新投资时,制造商的持股会降低批发价格和零售商的利润;而零售商的持股会增加批发价格但并不会损害零售商的利润。在制造商实施流程创新投资时,制造商的持股仍然会降低批发价格但只有在持股比例较高时才会损害零售商的利润;而当投资成本较高且持股比例较高时,零售商的持股反而会损害自身的利润。

Considering a two-tier supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer,this paper investigated the effect of partial holding between the manufacturer and the retailer on manufacturer′s process innovation investment and supply chain performance through game theory approach.By comparing the equilibrium results of no shareholding and shareholding,this paper further analyzed the value of partial holding on supply chain members.The results showed that,if the manufacturer doesn′t implement process innovation investment,manufacturer′s partial holding reduces wholesale price and retailer′s profit,while the retailer′s partial holding increases the wholesale price but doesn′t hurt retailer′s profit.If the manufacturer implements process innovation investment,manufacturer′s partial holding still reduces wholesale price,but when holding proportion is sufficiently high,manufacturer′s holding may hurt the retailer.Moreover,when both the investment cost and holding proportion are high,retailer′s holding may hurt itself.