不对称信息下社会责任投入与专利许可合同

Optimal patent licensing and SR investment strategy under asymmetric information

从不对称信息视角,研究供应链中社会责任(social responsibility,SR)投入与专利许可合同设计问题,考虑由专利持有企业、品牌企业以及原始设备制造商(original equipmentmanufacturer,OEM)组成的供应链系统,建立市场需求信息不对称下的多阶段动态博弈模型,分析品牌企业最优SR投入策略与专利持有企业最优专利许可合同设计,考察SR投入价值与信息共享策略.研究发现:专利持有企业会策略性地设计一组双重收费形式的许可合同,揭示市场需求信息;品牌企业是否进行SR投入存在可行条件,而SR投入不会影响专利持有企业对许可合同形式的选择,有利于提升消费者剩余和社会福利;最后,不对称信息会影响各企业的利润,品牌企业与专利持有企业能否达成信息共享合作取决于市场条件以及讨价还价能力.

Considering a supply chain consisting of a patent holder,a brand manufacture,and an original equipment manufacturer(OEM),the paper investigates the optimal social responsibility(SR)investment decisions and patent licensing contracts design in the presence of asymmetric information.A multi-stage dynamic game model under asymmetric information is established.The optimized supply chain equilibrium can be obtained through solving the model.Moreover,the effects of the SR investment and information sharing are analyzed.The results show that the optimal licensing contract is the two-part tariff licensing contract,which reveals market demand information.There is a feasible condition for brand manufacturer to choose the SR investment,but the choice of licensing contract will not be affected by SR.In addition,SR is beneficial to consumer surplus and social welfare.Finally,when the patent holder's bargaining power satisfies certain conditions,the brand manufacturer will share the supply chain's profit with the patent holder and Pareto improvement is realized.