经济增加值考核与“去杠杆”的内在关联——基于双重差分法与中介效应法的实证研究

Intrinsic Association Between EVA Performance Assessment and Deleveraging Policies——Empirical Research Based on Difference-in-Difference and Intermediary Effect Method

作为“管资本”的两项重要政策,经济增加值考核与去杠杆在推进国企改革过程中是否能够协调发展是值得深入探讨的问题。本文以2010年国资委在央企全面推行经济增加值考核为契机,利用2005-2014年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,深入分析经济增加值考核与企业去杠杆之间的相互影响。研究发现,经济增加值考核的实施抑制了央企高管主动去杠杆的积极性。在实施经济增加值考核后,央企的财务杠杆显著提升;且这种影响主要是由金融性财务杠杆增加而致。进一步的研究发现,金融性杠杆的增加削弱了经济增加值考核对非效率投资的治理效应。本文的研究不仅有助于拓宽经济增加值考核与去杠杆的研究范围;也有助于相关部门进一步完善和协调绩效考核与去杠杆政策,推动供给侧结构性改革。

As two policies of"capital management",if EVA Performance Assessment and Deleveraging policies can coordinated develop is worth to discuss.This paper take the central State-owend enterprises implemented EVA Performance Assessment as a chance and use listed companies data of China during 2005 to 2014 to analyze impact that EVA Performance Assessment makes on Deleveraging.The result indicates EVA Performance Assessment decrease the motivation of deleveraging of managers.After EVA Performance Assessment executed,financial leverage of central listed companies raised,because of raise of financial debt.Furthermore,financial debt decreases the governance effect of EVA Performance Assessment.The paper can not only expand scope of both EVA Performance Assessment and Deleveraging,but coordinate the two policies to promote structural reform of the supply-front.