股权集中度对证券集体诉讼威慑效果的影响

The Impact of Ownership Concentration on the Deterrent Effect of Securities Class Actions

本文检验股权集中度对特别代表人诉讼制度威慑效果的影响。研究结果表明:股权集中度较分散上市公司在特别代表人诉讼制度实施后更倾向购买董事高管责任险避险。进一步的研究表明投资者参与公司治理的积极性在新规实施后也发生显著提升。本文的发现突显了特别代表人诉讼制度的“事前威慑”作用。同时也反映出特别代表人诉讼制度对原告集团规模的依赖性,为后续优化集体诉讼制度提供了经验证据与思路。

This paper explores the impact of ownership concentration on the deterrent effect of the Special Securities Representa-tive Litigation System.We find a significant increase in the demand for directors'and officers'liability insurance for firms with a low degree of ownership concentration after the implementation of the new class action lawsuit system.We also find a signifi-cant improvement in shareholders'scrutiny of these firms after the event.The findings highlight the deterrent effect of the Spe-cial Securities Representative Litigation System.It also reflects its dependence on the size of the plaintiff group and provides em-pirical evidence and ideas for the subsequent optimization of the class action system.