环境管理制度改革与地方政府的策略性供地行为

Environmental Management System Reform and Strategic Land Supply Behaviour of Local Governments

现有关于边界污染的研究主要集中于如何治理企业污染,却忽略了如何避免污染型企业在边界地区聚集的问题。本文考察了作为环境管理制度改革的政府环保机构扁平化能否抑制县级政府向水污染密集型企业出让边界地区土地(即策略性供地)的行为。基于多重差分法的分析结果表明,该改革使得位于城市外圈且有河流覆盖的县级政府向水污染密集型企业出让的边界地区土地显著减少,且地方政府的这一偏好变化也会体现在土地出让方式和价格上,具体表现为以挂牌方式出让的土地面积减少以及土地出让价格提高。由于官员任期和事责的不一致性,该改革对地方政府策略性供地行为的抑制作用并非普遍存在:只能约束处于任期初期的官员行为,无法抑制处于任期末期的官员因晋升激励向水污染密集型企业供应土地的偏好。本文的研究结论意味着环保机构扁平化改革能有效约束县级政府在污染治理上的“搭便车”行为,也有利于阻止企业的污染转移行为。

Existing research on border pollution mainly focuses on how to manage corporate pollution,but ignores the issue of how to avoid polluting businesses from clustering in border areas.This paper investigates for the first time whether the flattening reform of government environmental protection agencies can curb the behaviour of county-level governments in strategically supplying land to water-polluting companies in border areas.Empirical results based on the multiple-differences method indicate that this reform significantly reduces the degree to which county governments supply border zone land located in the urban periphery and covered by rivers to water pollution-intensive companies.A series of robustness checks confirm the credibility of this conclusion.This change in local government preferences is also reflected in the methods and prices of land supply,specifically manifesting a reduction in the area of land supplied via listing methods and an increase in land supply prices.However,this restraining effect is not universally present.Due to the inconsistency between local officials’tenure and responsibilities,this reform can only constrain the behaviour of officials in the early stages of their tenure.The findings of this paper suggest that flattening reform of environmental protection agencies may effectively constrain county-level governments’“free-riding”behaviour in pollution control and help prevent pollution transfer behaviour by corporations.