互联网监管是否更加有效?——不同监管工具下惩罚机制推进企业降碳的效果与实施边界研究

Is Internet Regulation More Effective?Research on the Effectiveness and Implementation Boundaries of Penalty Mechanisms to Promote Corporate Carbon Reduction under Different Regulatory Tools

政府有效干预企业生产行为是促进低碳经济发展的重要引擎,政府如何选择监管工具和制定政策措施至关重要。运用Hotelling模型、动态演化博弈模型以及数据仿真模拟,探究在传统监管工具和互联网监管工具下政府对高碳企业实行惩罚机制的有效性。结果表明:在一定条件下政府采取传统监管和互联网监管都能促进企业生产低碳产品;在传统监管工具下实施静态惩罚机制有利于企业采取生产低碳产品的策略行为,且惩罚力度越大,企业趋于生产低碳产品的稳态速度越快,而在互联网监管下实施静态惩罚机制,会出现企业的“逆反”心理,抑制企业生产低碳产品;无论在传统监管还是互联网监管下,实施动态惩罚机制都有利于企业生产低碳产品,但是高强度的惩罚力度较低强度的惩罚力度并未表现出明显的监管优势。论文基于完全理性和有限理性的理论假设,分情境探究惩罚机制在不同监管工具下的实施效果,剖析监管模式与监管政策的适配效应,为政府“因时而异”地干预企业生产行为提供政策建议,有利于推进低碳经济发展。

Effective government intervention in the production behavior of enterprises is an important engine to promote the development of low-carbon economy.It is crucial for the government to choose regulatory tools and formulate policy measures.Using the Hotelling model,dynamic evolutionary game model and data simulation,the effectiveness of the government’s punitive mechanism on“high carbon”enterprises under traditional and Internet regulatory tools is investigated.The results show that under certain conditions,both traditional regulation and Internet regulation instruments can promote the production of low-carbon products.The implementation of static punishment mechanism under traditional regulation instruments is conducive to the strategic behavior of enterprises in the production of low-carbon products,and the stronger the punishment,the faster the steady state speed of enterprises tends to the production of low-carbon products.Nevertheless,the implementation of static punishment mechanism under Internet regulation instruments will result in the“rebellious”behavior of enterprises.The implementation of static punishment mechanism under Internet regulation instruments will lead to the“reverse”psychology of enterprises and inhibit the production of low-carbon products.Whether under traditional or Internet regulation instruments,the implementation of dynamic punishment mechanism is favorable to the production of low-carbon products by enterprises,but high-intensity punishment does not show obvious regulatory advantages over low-intensity punishment.Based on the theoretical assumptions of complete rationality and limited rationality,this study explores the implementation effect of the penalty mechanism under different regulatory tools in different scenarios and analyzes the fit effect of the regulatory model and regulatory policy.It provides policy suggestions for the government to intervene in the production behaviors of the enterprises in accordance with the time,which is conducive to the promotion of the development of low-carbon economy.