港口与船公司新型合谋策略的演化与均衡分析

Evolution and equilibrium analysis of new collusion strategy among ports and shipping companies

为在新型轴辐合谋背景下探讨港航系统实施轴辐合谋模式的可能性,构建一个港口和两家船公司之间的轴辐合谋模型,分析具有产能约束的港口和船公司在轴辐合谋下的均衡策略。研究发现:轴辐合谋前,船公司之间默契合谋会对港口利润造成损失;轴辐合谋后,港口和船公司分别降低其服务价格和运价,在保证船公司利润不变的情况下港口利润得到改善,港航系统总利润实现增加;从长期角度看轴辐合谋将成为港口和船公司的最优策略。港口与船公司轴辐合谋的稳定性大于船公司默契合谋的稳定性。该研究结果可为预防和规制航运业新的合谋模式提供决策参考。

To explore the possibility of implementing the hub-and-spoke collusion mode in the port and shipping system in the context of new hub-and-spoke collusion,the paper builds a hub-and-spoke collusion model among a port and two shipping companies,and analyzes the equilibrium strategy of the port and shipping companies with capacity constraint under hub-and-spoke collusion.It is found as follows:before hub-and-spoke collusion,the tacit collusion between shipping companies can cause loss to port profit;through hub-and-spoke collusion,the port and shipping companies respectively reduce their service prices and freight rates,and under the premise of ensuring that shipping company profits remain unchanged,the port profit improves and the total profit of the port and shipping system increases.From a long-term perspective,the hub-and-spoke collusion is the optimal strategy for ports and shipping companies.The stability of hub-and-spoke collusion among ports and shipping companies is greater than that of tacit collusion between shipping companies.The research results can provide decision-making reference for preventing and regulating the new collusion mode in the shipping industry.