地方政府补贴下渔业碳汇供需侧演化博弈研究

An Evolutionary Game of the Supply and Demand Side of Carbon Sinks in Fisheries under Local Government Subsidies

碳汇渔业是生产蓝碳,助力实现碳中和的重要手段,具有可观的经济与环境效益。然而,碳汇渔业的实施涉及到多方主体的利益,是一个复杂的动态博弈问题。现有研究很少以碳汇渔业为切入点将政府、养殖商及企业同时纳入系统进行分析。在连江、莆田接连取得试点成功的背景下,基于碳汇渔业的视角探讨蓝碳交易有利于为后续的渔业碳汇交易试点提供科学的建议。因此,本文构建了涉及地方政府、水产养殖商和企业的三方演化博弈模型,分析了每个主体的策略选择对系统稳定性的影响。研究结果表明:(1)碳汇渔业补贴对演化进程具有双重影响。在一定范围内,适度的碳汇渔业补贴可以激励水产养殖商向碳汇渔业转变,但过高的碳汇渔业补贴可能会引发沉重的财政负担而迫使政府选择不补贴。(2)补贴后的蓝碳单价与碳税的差异是影响企业策略选择的关键因素,当补贴后的蓝碳单价小于碳税时,企业趋向于购买蓝碳,并且补贴后的蓝碳单价越低,企业的响应速度越快。(3)参照初始情景,适度提高地方政府的补贴水平可以促使三方演化博弈达到理想状态。在这种补贴水平下,无论三方主体的初始概率如何,均不会影响理想状态的实现及延续。

Carbon sink fisheries are an important means of producing blue carbon and contributing to carbon neutrality,with significant economic and environmental benefits.However,the implementation of carbon sink fisheries involves multiple parties and is a dynamic game.Existing studies have rarely analyzed carbon sink fisheries as an entry point to include governments,aquaculturists,and enterprises in the system at the same time.Against the background of the success of the pilot projects in Lianjiang and Putian,exploring blue carbon trading based on the perspective of carbon sink fisheries will help to provide scientific recommendations.Therefore,a tripartite evolutionary game model involving local governments,aquaculturists,and enterprises was constructed,and the impact of each subject's strategy choice on the stability of the system was analyzed.The results show that(1)subsidies for carbon sink fisheries have a dual effect on the evolutionary process.Within a certain range,moderate subsidies for carbon sink fisheries can motivate aquaculturists to shift to carbon sink fisheries,but too high subsidies level can cause a heavy financial burden and force the government to give up.(2)The difference between the price of subsidized blue carbon and the carbon tax is a key factor affecting the strategy choice of enterprises.When the price of subsidized blue carbon is lower than the carbon tax,enterprises tend to purchase blue carbon,and the lower the price of subsidized blue carbon,the faster the response of enterprises.(3)Based on the initial scenario,a moderate increase in the subsidy level of the local government can lead the three-party evolutionary game to the ideal outcome.Under this subsidy level,no matter what the initial probability of each party is,it will not affect the realization and continuation of the ideal outcome.