“抱团取暖”还是“各行其道”--地方债务规模管理中的同群效应

Huddling Together or Going One's Own Way?--Peer Effects in Local Government Debt Management

化存量、遏增量是近年来化解地方债务风险的重点方向,以往研究多关注地方债务的增量问题,较少关注地方政府具体以何种形式管理债务存量。本文从群体内互动影响视角出发的实证分析发现,我国地方债务规模管理中存在显著的同群效应。机制分析发现,借助与同伴相似的债务规模管理策略来避免自身债务规模被过度关注的藏匿机制是地方债务规模同群效应的重要成因,表明我国官员政绩考核制度形成的约束是塑造地方政府行为特征的重要因素。进一步的异质性分析显示,东部地区的地方债务规模同群效应强于中西部地区,金融分权程度高的地区其同群效应也更为显著。本文的研究不仅从同群效应视角揭示了我国地方债务规模管理的特征,也对如何完善地方债务管理体系、有效防范化解重点领域风险,进而实现经济高质量发展有一定启示。

Local government debt in China has exhibited clustering characteristics in recent years.This phenomenon raises questions about whether there are peer effects in local government debt levels and if so,what are the potential mechanisms behind them.This paper tries to answer these questions.By using data on local government debt from 2009 to 2022,this paper finds significant peer effects in local government debt management:A one standard deviation increase in the debt level of peer governments(i.e.other prefecture cities in the same province)leads to a 7.7%increase in the per capita debt level of the focal local government.This result sustains after the endogeneity of peer debt is taken into account.Specifically,the study uses the tenure of local officials as the instrumental variable,and the approval of urban agglomerations as the quasi-natural experiment setting.Further analysis shows that the peer effects mainly come from the behavior of hiding in the crowd by adopting similar debt management strategies to those of peers and the“everyone-does-it”defense.In contrast,the traditional learning channel and the competition for promotion channel,as documented in existing literature,have negligible impact.These results suggest that constraints embedded in the assessment system for local officials may be an important factor in shaping local government behavior.Lastly,the peer effects are stronger in East China than in Central and West China,and also stronger in areas with a higher degree of financial decentralization.This paper contributes to existing literature in the four following aspects.First,it extends research on the characteristics of local government debt management and finds peer effects in local government debt levels,which is not documented in existing literature.Second,it finds a new mechanism,i.e.,hiding in the crowd and using the“everyone-does-it”defense,behind the peer effects.Third,it shows that the intensity of peer effects varies from place to place,depending on local financial development level.Fourth,it examines the impact of urban agglomeration policies on local government debt.The research results have the following policy implications.First,regulatory authorities should consider peer effects in local government behavior and guide debt issuance based on regional characteristics.Second,regulatory authorities should design a more scientific system to evaluate the performance of local officials.Third,it is crucial to shore up the market's decisive role in allocating financial resources and draw a clear boundary between the responsibilities of local governments and those of local financial institutions.Fourth,the planning and designing of urban agglomerations should take into account cluster-specific local debt management systems.