摘要
区块链技术有助于应对专利交易中信息不透明、确权难等问题,为专利交易模式的创新提供了新的选择。通过分析区块链在专利交易中的作用,构建由交易申请方、交易平台、意向受让方组成的三方演化博弈模型。基于博弈收益矩阵分析专利交易系统的演化稳定点,讨论主体的行为策略;并在此基础上,对不同情境进行初始参数赋值,通过仿真分析验证关键因素对专利交易系统及各参与主体行为策略的影响。研究结果表明:参数的数值关系会影响专利交易系统的演化稳定策略;交易平台的区块链应用策略主要受到运营成本、欺诈行为所带来损失的影响;区块链作用下掩饰成本的增加,能够抑制交易申请方的欺诈行为;调查成本与所遭受损失的降低,有助于促使意向受让方选择交易。在丰富相关理论研究的同时,为专利交易中区块链应用实践提供参考。
Blockchain technology helps to deal with problems such as opaque information and difficulty in confirming rights in patent transaction,and provides a new choice for patent transaction model innovation.By analyzing the role of blockchain in patent transaction,a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of transaction applicant,transaction platform and intended transferee is constructed.Based on the game income matrix,the game evolution stability of patent trading system is analyzed,and the behavior strategy of the subject is discussed.On this basis,parameter values are assigned to different situations,and the influence of key factors on the patent trading system and the behavior strategy of each participant is verified by simulation analysis.The results show that the numerical relationship of parameters affects the evolutionary stability strategy of patent trading system.The blockchain application strategy of the trading platform is mainly affected by operating costs and losses caused by fraud.The increase of the concealing cost of under the role of blockchain can inhibit the fraudulent behavior of the transaction applicant.The reduction of investigation costs and losses can help to encourage the prospective transferee to choose the transaction.While enri-ching relevant theoretical research,it also provides reference for the application practice of blockchain in patent transactions.
作者
康朕玮
李静
朱建明
KANG Zhenwei;LI Jing;ZHU Jianming(School of Information,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)
出处
《计算机科学》
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第10期432-441,共10页
Computer Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(62072487)
面向融合应用的区块链安全跨链与监管原型系统研究(LD22F020002)。
关键词
区块链
专利交易
欺诈行为
三方演化博弈
仿真分析
Blockchain
Patent transactions
Fraudulent conduct
Tripartite evolutionary game
Simulation analysis