基于演化博弈的新型农业经营主体与小农户协同发展研究

Research on collaborative development between new agricultural management entities and small farmers based on evolutionary game models

全面推进乡村振兴、加快建设农业强国,必须统筹兼顾培育新型农业经营主体和扶持小农户。政府激励、新型农业经营主体带动和小农户参与是促进新型农业经营主体与小农户协同发展的有效路径。构建“政府-新型农业经营主体-小农户”三方博弈主体的演化博弈模型,揭示政府激励政策、新型农业经营主体带动成本和小农户收益等关键决策变量对协同演化路径的影响机理。研究发现:①当政府消极激励时的固定监管成本大于其积极激励时的固定监管成本,且新型农业经营主体与小农户单方愿意合作的情形下,政府补贴不能弥补这两类主体各自所付出的额外成本,此时系统将趋于政府积极激励、新型农业经营主体不带动、小农户不参与的(1,0,0)均衡状态;②当政府积极激励时对两类主体的补贴与监管成本之和小于政府消极激励时的固定监管成本,且新型农业经营主体与小农户协同发展时均可取得相应收益增值,此时系统将趋于政府积极激励、新型农业经营主体带动、小农户参与的(1,1,1)均衡状态。数值仿真发现,政府采取不同激励政策下的固定监管成本之差、新型农业经营主体的带动成本及小农户标准化生产成本,这3类重要参数变化将显著影响各主体的最优策略选择。因此,在政府积极激励的政策背景下,有效控制博弈主体的重要成本参数可实现新型农业经营主体与小农户协同发展。

To comprehensively promote rural revitalization and accelerate the construction of an agricultural powerhouse,it is essential to balance the cultivation of new types of agricultural operators with support for small farmers.Effective pathways to foster the collaborative development between new agricultural operators and small farmers include government incentives,leadership from new agricultural operators,and participation from small farmers.By constructing an evolutionary game model among the“government-new agricultural operators-small farmers”triadic game entities,this study reveals the impact mechanism of key decision variables such as government incentive policies,the driving costs of new agricultural operators,and the benefits of small farmers on the path of collaborative evolution.The findings indicate that:Firstly,when the government provides passive incentives,the fixed regulatory costs are higher than when it actively incentivizes.In the case where new agricultural operators and small farmers are willing to cooperate unilaterally,government subsidies cannot compensate for the additional costs incurred by both parties,leading the system to tend towards an equilibrium state where the government actively incentivizes,new agricultural operators do not lead,and small farmers do not participate;Secondly,when the government actively incentivizes,the sum of subsidies and regulatory costs for both parties is less than the fixed regulatory costs when the government is passively incentivizing.Both new agricultural operators and small farmers can realize value addition when engaging in coordinated development,leading the system to tend towards an equilibrium state where the government actively incentivizes,new agricultural operators lead,and small farmers participate.Numerical simulations suggest that the difference in fixed regulatory costs under different incentive policies of the government,the driving costs of new agricultural operators,and the standardized production costs of small farmers,these three key parameters significantly influence the optimal strategy choices of each entity.Therefore,with active government incentives,effectively controlling the important cost parameters of game subjects can achieve the coordinated development of new agricultural operators and small farmers.