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一种包含三重误解的新突破——评李扬关于康德区分逻辑谓词与实在谓词的新理解

A new breakthrough with triple misunderstandings:On Li Yang's new understanding of Kant's distinction between logical and real predicates
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摘要 康德在反驳本体论证明时作了逻辑谓词与实在谓词之分,并提出了“存在不是实在的谓词”论题。流行解读模式没有认识到这一区分实质上是“模态逻辑谓词”与“先验实在谓词”之分,因而将之简单误解为分析命题的谓词不是综合命题的谓词,进而把“存在论题”要么误解为“存在不是实存”,要么误解为“主观综合命题的谓词不是客观综合命题的谓词”。在《论康德对逻辑谓词与实在谓词的区分》一文中,李扬提出“逻辑谓词是形式意义上的谓词,即在一个判断中占据谓词位置的概念”,“实在谓词是能够充当客观综合判断的谓词的概念”且意指事物的实在性等新观点。尤其重要的是,他认为康德的逻辑谓词与实在谓词之分,直接指向本体论证明对存有与实在性的混淆,康德反驳的关键,是区分实存这个模态概念与作为实在性的实在谓词。这是对流行解读模式的重要突破,触及了“模态逻辑谓词”与“先验实在谓词”的区分模式。但是,不论是对逻辑谓词,还是对实在谓词,抑或对二者之间的关系,李扬都存在着误解,导致他对逻辑谓词与实在谓词之分的理解总是受到流行解读模式的影响:他在“SistP”命题内部探讨逻辑谓词与实在谓词的关系,依然是对“模态逻辑谓词”与“先验实在谓词”区分模式的偏离;他把根据占有谓词位置而将表达事物性质的谓词P也说成是逻辑谓词,会模糊模态概念作为逻辑谓词与实在谓词的区别。 Kant made a distinction between the logical predicate and the real predicate when refuting ontological proof,and put forward the issue"Sein is not a real predicate".The popular interpretation mode does not realize that this distinction is essentially a distinction between"modal logic predicates"and"transcendental real predicates",hence simply misinterpreting it as that the predicate of analytic proposition is not the predicate of synthetic proposition,and misinterpreting"Sein proposition"as either"Sein is not real existence"or"the predicate of subjective synthetic proposition is not the predicate of objective synthetic proposition".In the article"On Kant's Distinction between Logical Predicates and Real Predicates",Li Yang proposed that"logical predicates are predicates in the formal sense,that is,concepts that occupy the position of predicates in a judgment","real predicates are predicates that can act as objective synthetic judgments"and refer to the reality of things.More importantly in particular,he believed that Kant's distinction between logical predicates and real predicates directly points to the confusion of existence and reality in ontological proof,and that the key to Kant's refutation is to distinguish between the modal concept of existence and the real predicate as reality,which is an important breakthrough in the popular mode of interpretation and involves the mode of distinction between"modal logical predicates"and"transcendental real predicates".However,whether it is about the logical predicate,or about the real predicate,or about the relationship between them,Li Yang misunderstood them all,and his misunderstandings have led to the fact that his understanding of the distinction between the logical predicate and the real predicate has always been influenced by the popular interpretation mode.He discussed the relationship between logical predicates and real predicates in the proposition of"S ist P",which is still a deviation from the distinguishing mode between"modal logical predicate"and"transcendental real predicate".He considered the predicate P which expresses the nature of things according to the position of the predicate as a logical predicate,and this would blur the difference of the modal concept between the logical predicate and the real predicate.
作者 舒远招 SHU Yuanzhao(Yuelu Academy,Hunan University,Changsha 410083,China)
出处 《中南大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2024年第5期45-58,共14页 Journal of Central South University:Social Sciences
基金 湖南省社会科学基金项目“康德哲学中逻辑谓词与实在谓词难题及其解读模式研究”(22YBA023)。
关键词 康德 逻辑的谓词 实在的谓词 新突破 三重误解 Kant logical predicate real predicate a new breakthrough triple misunderstandings
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