客户集中度与高管薪酬粘性——基于风险承担视角

Customer Concentration and Executive Compensation Stickiness:A Perspective of Risk-taking

客户集中度是影响公司治理决策的重要因素。文章以2007-2018年A股上市公司为样本,考察客户集中度对高管薪酬粘性的影响。研究发现:客户集中度越高,高管薪酬粘性越高。进一步研究发现:当客户集中度给公司带来的风险较高(如无关联或同城客户、公司专用性投资较高、市场份额较低以及产品市场竞争较为激烈),或公司更需要激励高管进行风险承担(如投资机会较多)时,两者之间的正向关系更为显著。结果表明,客户集中度较高的公司为激励高管会设计“奖优不罚劣”的粘性薪酬契约。不同于发达国家采用股票期权等方式激励高管进行风险承担,文章基于现金薪酬的凸性激励契约设计,为发展中国家上市公司高管薪酬契约设计提供了经验证据。

Customer concentration is an important factor influencing corporate gov-ernance decisions.This paper examines the impact of customer concentration on execut-ive compensation stickiness using a sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018.The study finds that higher customer concentration leads to greater executive com-pensation stickiness.Further analysis reveals that this positive relationship is more pro-nounced when customer concentration poses higher risks to the company(such as non-af-filiated or no local customers,higher company-specific investments,lower market share,and more intense product market competition)or when the company requires greater in-centives for executives to undertake risks(such as abundant investment opportunities).The results suggest that companies with higher customer concentration tend to design ex-ecutive compensation contracts with high stickiness to motivate executives,following the concept of rewarding the good without punishing the bad.Unlike developed countries that use stock options to incentivize risk-taking among executives,this paper provides empir-ical evidence for the design of convex cash compensation contracts in developing coun-tries'listed companies.