日本电力现货市场价格飙升是如何发生和持续的?——基于制度设计的分析视角

How Did the Surge in Japanese Electricity Spot Market Prices Occur and Persist?:A Perspective Based on Institutional Designs

2021年1月前后,在没有发生自然灾害的情况下,日本电力现货市场发生了运行失调事件,现货市场价格从10日元/kWh飙升至251日元/kWh,且前后持续40多天,这在日本乃至世界电力市场发展史上是绝无仅有的。研究表明,本次事件与相关制度设计有直接的因果关系,当时的制度不但没能有效对冲反而助长了客观现象对电力现货市场的负面冲击,放大了负面效果。具体而言,偏差考核电价形成机制不完善、市场上电力供给总量信息的不透明和不充分、在位电力企业内部可能存在的交叉补贴和交易风险分散机制的不健全是主要原因。

In October 2023,the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration jointly issued the"Notice on Further Accelerating the Construction of the Power Spot Market",marking the construction of China's power spot market has entered a new stage.In order to reasonably learn from the experience and lessons of other countries to realize the guiding principle of"establishing first and breaking later,carrying out stable and lasting",this study selects a typical case occurred in Japanese spot market that has not been systematically studied in China for analysis.Around January 2021,in the absence of natural disasters,the Japanese electricity spot market occurred a dysfunctional event,and the spot market price soared from 10 yen/kWh to 251 yen/kWh,and lasted for more than 40 days,which is unique in the history of Japan and even the world electricity market.Our research shows that this incident has a direct causal relationship with the design of the relevant institutions,that is to say,institutions at that time not only failed to effectively hedge but also contributed to negative impacts of the objective phenomenon on the power spot market and amplified the negative effects.Specifically,the main reasons are the imperfect formation mechanism of the imbalance power price,the opacity and insufficiency of the total electricity supply information in the market,the possible cross-subsidies within the existing power enterprises and the imperfect transaction risk dispersion mechanism.