欲扬先抑:动态博弈视角下B2C平台引流的合作策略研究

Refusing for Accepting:Research on B2C Platform s Cooperative Strategies for Flow Attraction Based on Dynamic Games

在目前主要流量渠道被少数头部入口企业所占据,且B2C平台初创期普遍缺乏资金的情况下,与流量入口的合作对平台引流十分重要。将独立引流和限定价格分别作为平台和流量入口的非合作策略嵌入到双方合作谈判过程中,对平台的合作引流策略进行研究,从动态博弈视角回答如何提高平台合作谈判地位问题。在一个流量入口作为供给者和一个平台作为需求者的情境下,首先通过动态网络外部性增长模型描述引流在平台成长过程中的作用,然后基于多阶段动态博弈模型将平台和流量入口的谈判过程区分为非合作阶段和合作阶段。各阶段均衡结果表明:(1)如果流量入口在非合作阶段不限定价格,当平台独立引流的边际成本低于(高于)阈值时,平台的最优选择是在非合作阶段选择独立吸引一部分流量(不独立引流),从而增加合作阶段的利润分配;(2)如果流量入口在非合作阶段限定价格,平台的最优选择是在非合作阶段不独立引流,但当平台独立引流的边际成本低于阈值时,流量入口会降低其价格限定水平,使平台在合作阶段获得更多的利润分配;(3)尽管流量入口会将限定价格作为非合作阶段的占优策略,但这种承诺并不可靠,在平台做出策略选择后,流量入口总存在提高或降低限定价格的动机。

In the current situation where the main flow channels have been occupied by a few head entrance companies and the start-up B2C platforms generally lack sufficient funds,the cooperation in attracting flow is very important to the platforms.Embedding independent attraction and limited price strategies into the process of bilateral cooperation negotiation as the non-cooperative strategies of the platform and flow entrance,the cooperative flow attraction strategies of the platform is studied,which mainly answers the question of how to improve its cooperative negotiating position from the perspective of dynamic game.We establish a multistage dynamic game model for platform and flow entrance,which are considered as the supplier and the demander of flow respectively,based on a dynamic two-sided network externality growth model.The model distinguishes the negotiation process of cooperation into different stages:Non-cooperation and cooperation.The following conclusions are obtained by the every stage equilibrium:(1)Under the condition that the price of the entrance is not limited,the platform can increase the final profit distribution by independently attracting a portion of the flow(or not independently attracting any flow)before cooperation when the marginal cost of independent attraction is lower(or higher)than a certain threshold;(2)Under the condition that the entrance limits its price,the optimal choice for the platform is not to attract flow independently.However,when the platform s marginal cost is below a certain threshold,the entrance will reduce its price-limited level,which can enable the platform to obtain a higher profit allocation in the cooperation;(3)The entrance will use a limited price as a dominant strategy.However,this promise is not reliable and there is always an incentive for entrance to raise or lower the limited price after the platform has made its strategic choice.