政府信用、政府融资与地方政府债务

Government Credit、Government Financing and Local Government Debt

近些年,地方发展和投融资短缺的矛盾日益凸显,地方政府债务问题也备受关注,地方政府融资理念和体系模式亟待创新。通过引入政府信用的概念,结合中国地方政府的制度特点和实际运行,构建了基于政府信用的理论框架,以诠释地方政府融资的机理,并通过构建多期重复博弈论模型,探究地方政府债务的形成机制和发展趋势,最后提出相应政策建议,本文对理解中国发展模式、化解地方政府债务、构建新形势下的地方政府投融资体系,具有一定的理论和现实意义。

In recent years,many local governments have been restricted by the shortage of funds in economic development,and the issue of local government debt has attracted much attention,local government financing concepts and system models are in urgent need of innovation.This paper introduces the concept of government credit,combines it with the characteristics and actual operation of local governments in China,constructs a theoretical framework of government credit,todiscuss the financing mechanisms of local governments,and constructs a multi-period incomplete information game theory model to investigate the mechanisms and trends of debt expansion,finally put forward related policy recommendations.This article has certain theoretical and practical significance for understanding China's development model,resolving local government debt,and building a local government investment and financing system under the new situation.