平台竞争中的数据量决策研究

Research on Data Volume Decision-Making in Platform Competition

数据成为重要的生产要素,数据量决策权的归属目前却并不明朗。本文构建了双边市场中平台收集消费者数据的双寡头竞争模型,分析当数据量分别由平台和消费者决定时的均衡结果,并比较了由不同主体决定的均衡数据量以及各个群体的福利。研究发现:当隐私泄露风险较高时,消费者愿意提供的数据量往往低于平台想要的数据量;从社会福利的角度出发,由平台决定数据量是更好的选择;当由平台决定数据量时,消费者剩余、厂商剩余和社会总福利都随着隐私泄露风险的增加而降低,但如果赋予消费者决定数据量的权利,那么隐私泄露风险对用户剩余和福利的影响并不是单调的。本文的结论可以为数据确权和个人信息保护的相关政策制定提供理论参考。

Data has become a critical factor in production.However,the ownership of data volume decision rights is not clear at present.This paper constructs a duopoly model in a two-sided market in which the platforms collect consumers'data,analyzes the equilibrium outcomes when the data volume is determined by platform enterprises and consumers respectively,and compares the equilibrium data volume and the welfare of each group.It is found that when the privacy disclosure risk is high,the data volume that consumers are willing to provide is often lower than what the platform wants.From the perspective of social welfare,it is better to give platform enterprises the right to decide the data volume.When the data volume is determined by the platform,consumer surplus,manufacturer surplus,and total social welfare all decrease with the increase of privacy disclosure risk.But if consumers are given the right to decide how much data that platform can use,the impact of privacy disclosure risk on users'surplus and social welfare is not monotonous.The conclusion of this paper provides a theoretical reference for the policymaking of data ownership confirmation and personal information protection.