经营投资问责能否提升国有企业投资效率?

Can the Accountability System for Operation and Investment Improve the Investment Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises?

本文基于国有企业经营投资问责制度分地区、分阶段实施的准自然实验,系统考察了经营投资问责对国有企业投资效率的影响。研究发现,经营投资问责制度实施之后,国有企业的投资效率显著提升,表现为投资-投资机会敏感性显著增加,降低代理成本、提高决策稳健性和缓解信息不对称是经营投资问责制度发挥作用的重要机制。进一步研究表明,经营投资问责对投资效率的提升作用在投资过度、地方国有企业、高管风险偏好较高、内部治理机制较差、外部监督力度较弱的样本中更为明显。同时,经营投资问责发挥投资效率提升效应后显著优化了国有企业的经营表现,实现了国有资本保值增值。本研究可以为健全国有企业经营投资问责制度、推动国有企业高质量发展提供启示。

Based on the implementation of the operation and investment accountability(OIA)of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)in different regions and stages,this paper systematically examines the impact of the OIA on the investment efficiency of SOEs.The results find that after the implementation of the OIA,the investment efficiency of SOEs is significantly improved,as evidenced by a significant increase in the sensitivity of investment-investment opportunities.The reduction of agency costs,the improvement of decision-making robustness,and the alleviation of information asymmetry are the important mechanisms through which OIA operates.Further research finds that the effect of OIA on investment efficiency is more obvious in samples with excessive investment,local SOEs,higher executive risk appetite,poorer internal governance mechanism,and weaker external supervision.At the same time,OIA significantly optimizes the operational performance of SOEs and realizes the value-added of state-owned capital after investment efficiency improves.This paper provides important policy insights for the improvement of the accountability system of SOEs and for the promotion of the high-quality development of SOEs.