摘要
The Company Law of China of 2023 has recognized the director's duty of care besides the existing duties of loyalty and diligence.The director's duty of oversight has not been clearly stipulated in the law,although the duty of oversight has increasingly become independent of the director's other duties in administrative and judicial practice in China.Its justification is based on the central role of the board of directors in corporate governance and the multi-dimensional demands of stakeholders.Moreover,the duty of oversight can balance the powers and responsibilities of the board members.This paper proposes that the duty of oversight of directors should be introduced and be fully recognized and adopted in Chinese administrative and judicial practice in response to the needs of the new era.Meanwhile,the imputation principle of oversight duty should be the fault principle instead of the presumption of fault in order to balance the burden of proof.
董事监督义务日益成为一种相对独立于董事勤勉义务、忠实义务和注意义务的义务类型,其正当性基础在于董事会中心主义的角色定位以及公司治理中利益相关方的多重诉求。虽然我国2023年修订的《公司法》增加了董事注意义务,但并未明确规定监督义务。董事监督义务是平衡董事会权力与责任的重要基石,未来应考虑增设董事的监督义务,以回应行政监管和司法实践的关切,从而实现公司永续治理。同时,为合理分配举证责任,董事监督义务的归责原则应适用过错原则,而非过错推定原则。此外,董事监督义务不应无限扩大,董事可以援引商业判断规则免责。董事会应确保公司内部建立有效的内控系统,一旦收到警示信息,董事应及时采取行动避免法律与商业风险的发生。
