为什么是义务论?——揭开菲尼斯自然法理论的面纱

The Deontological Feature of the Theory of Natural Law of John Finnis

学界对菲尼斯自然法理论性质之判定存在较大争论,需要分析该理论的具体内容,以得出恰当结论。作为菲尼斯自然法理论的第一原则,基本善虽然是一种实体目的,但因为其自身各种特性而呈现出形式性。实践理智性方法论的基本要求是菲尼斯自然法理论的另一核心组成部分,是正当参与基本善的途径。不过,基本善在其中出现了虚化的情形,因此,这些基本要求构成了人类正当行为的形式性内容。而形式性是义务论的重要表征,菲尼斯自然法理论与之相合。同时,菲尼斯自然法理论也符合义务论的三重结构:道德要求是行动者相关的、道德要求有时是非最大化的、行动者行为的所有后果并非都和道德评价有关。因此,菲尼斯自然法理论总体上是义务论。

There is a great controversy over the nature of the natural law theory of John Finnis.It is necessary to analyze the concrete content of the theory in order to draw a proper conclusion.As the first principle of the natural law theory of Finnis,the basic good is a concept of substantive purposes,it takes on formality because of its various characteristics.Basic methodological requirements of practical reasonableness is another core component of the natural law theory of Finnis,which are the ways to par‐ticipate in the basic good properly.However,the basic good appears to be hollow in this situation,and these formal basic requirements constitute the content of human legitimate behavior.The formality is an important representation of deontology,and Finnis’theory of natural law agrees with it.At the same time,Finis’s natural law theory also conforms to the triple structure of deontology:moral requirements are related to the agent,moral requirements are sometimes non-maximized,and not all consequences of the agent’s actions are related to moral evaluation.Therefore,Finnis’theory of natural law is deonto‐logical in general.