持存空间与客观秩序——对康德“反驳唯心论”的斯特劳森式误读的辨正

Permanent Space and Objective Order——A Correction of the Strawsonian Misreading of Kant’s“Refutation of Idealism”

康德在“反驳唯心论”中提出一个致力于抗衡对外部世界现实性的怀疑的论证。斯特劳森在《感觉的界限》中引入了“空间是持存的”这一命题来理解康德的论证。斯特劳森的这一解读影响深远,也成了康德解释界的惯有模式,并构成英美学界诸多争论中的主要议题。通过论证分析和概念分析表明,斯特劳森对“空间是持存的”这一命题的理解中隐秘地包含了对外部世界对象之现实性的假定,因此将这一命题引入“反驳唯心论”的论证之中的做法将使得整个论证变成循环。“空间”在康德本人的“反驳唯心论”论证中只是一个附加的描述词,不能充当充足的论据的角色。

In the“Refutation of Idealism”,Kant presents an argument against the skepticism about the reality of external world.In The Bounds of Sense,Strawson introduces the proposition“space is per‐manent”to interpret this argument.Strawson’s reading is now popular in Kant-interpretation and seems to dominate many debates among the Anglo-American scholars.This paper shows,through argumenta‐tive and conceptual analysis,that Strawson’s understanding of the proposition“space is permanent”im‐plies an assumption of the reality of objects in the external world,and that the introduction of this propo‐sition into“Refutation of Idealism”will turn the argument into a circular one.In Kant’s own proof,on the contrary,the concept of space is a mere additional descriptor rather than a sufficient argumentative support.