地方政府债务与企业价格加成——理论分析与经验事实

Local Government Debt and Corporate Price Markup:Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Evidence

地方政府债务风险是中国系统性金融风险的重要来源,对宏观经济发展和微观经济主体有着深刻的影响。本文基于2008—2015年沪深A股上市公司数据和地级市政府债务数据,从理论和实证两方面讨论了地方政府债务对企业价格加成的影响及其影响机制。研究结果显示,地方政府债务显著降低了企业的价格加成。机制分析结果显示,企业融资成本和劳动力成本增加是地方政府债务抑制企业价格加成的重要传导渠道。异质性分析结果显示,规模较小、信息不对称程度高、成本节约能力较弱的企业受到地方政府债务规模扩张对其价格加成的负面影响更大。进一步研究发现,地方政府债务显著提高了地区内企业价格加成的离散度,降低了资源配置效率。

Local government debt risk is a significant source of systemic financial risk in China,profoundly impacting both macroeconomic development and microeconomic entities.Based on data from A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and municipal-level government debt data from 2008 to 2015,this paper discusses the effects of local government debt on corporate price markup from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.The research findings illustrate that local government debt significantly reduces corporate price markup.Mechanism analysis reveals that increased corporate financing costs and labor costs are key transmission channels through which local government debt suppresses corporate price markup.Heterogeneity analysis shows that smaller companies,those with higher degrees of information asymmetry,and those with weaker cost-saving abilities,are more negatively affected by the expansion of local government debt on their price markup.Further research finds that local government debt significantly increases the dispersion of corporate price markups within a region,diminishing resource allocation efficiency.