战略投资者参与下的上市公司盈余管理行为研究

Earnings Management Behavior of Listed Companies with the Participation of Strategic Investors

为了深入探究战略投资者对企业盈余管理的影响机制,选取2010-2020年沪深A股上市公司数据,通过构建理论模型并运用相关数据进行实证检验。结果显示:战略投资者的参与显著影响了上市公司的盈余管理行为,降低了上市公司进行盈余管理的程度,提升了企业财务报告的透明度,对企业盈余管理具有一定的抑制作用。进一步研究发现,内部控制在战略投资者与企业盈余管理的关系中发挥一定的调节作用,在内部控制质量较高的企业中,战略投资者对盈余管理的抑制作用更加明显。因此,企业要充分认识引入战略投资者的价值意义,政府要发挥其在政策引导和市场监管方面的作用,战略投资者要关注企业的投资价值及其潜在的风险。

In order to deeply explore the impact mechanism of strategic investors on earnings management,this paper selects data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020,and constructs a theoretical model to do empirical testing.The results show that the participation of strategic investors significantly affects the earnings management behavior of listed companies,reduces the degree of earnings management,improves the transparency and quality of financial reports,which has a certain inhibitory effect on earnings management.Further research has found that internal control has a certain moderating effect on the relationship between strategic investors and earnings management.In enterprises with higher internal control,strategic investors have a more significant inhibitory effect on earnings management.Therefore,enterprises should fully understand the value and significance of introducing strategic investors,the government should play its role in policy guidance and market regulation,while strategic investors should pay attention to the investment value and potential risks of enterprises.