摘要
加快动力电池再生利用技术的研发,是实现废旧动力电池规范化回收和资源化再生利用的重要路径,因此,探究激励动力电池再生利用技术创新的政府规制措施具有重要意义。基于生产者责任延伸制度,构建由第三方再制造商、动力电池生产商和政府组成的三方演化博弈模型,运用Matlab对三方主体在不同稳定性条件下的演化策略进行仿真,对比分析政府规制措施对第三方再制造商、动力电池生产商策略演化的影响。研究发现:1)政府实施动力电池再利用技术研发补贴政策,能够有效促进第三方再制造商积极投入,动力电池生产商主动承担生产延伸责任;2)相对于动力电池生产商,政府补贴第三方再制造商,能够显著提高积极投入研发的意愿;反之,政府对动力电池生产商采取适当的惩罚措施,更加能够激励其主动承担研发再生利用技术的责任。
Accelerating the research and development of power battery recycling technology is an important path to achieve the standardised recovery and resourceful recycling of waste power batteries,therefore,it is of great significance to explore the government regulatory measures to stimulate the technological innovation of power battery recycling.Based on the Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR)system,a three-party evolutionary game model is constructed consisting of third-party remanufacturers,power battery producers and the government,and the evolutionary strategies of the three parties under different stability conditions is simulated by using Matlab,and the impact of government regulatory measures is compared and analyzed on the evolution of strategies of third-party remanufacturers and power battery producers.It is found that:1)the government's implementation of power battery reuse technology R&D subsidy policy can effectively promote the third-party remanufacturers to actively invest in the power battery manufacturers to take the initiative to assume the responsibility of production extension;2)the government's subsidy to the third-party remanufacturers can significantly increase the willingness to actively invest in the R&D relative to the power battery manufacturers;on the contrary,the government adopts the appropriate punitive measures for the power battery producers,which is more capable of motivating them to take the initiative to undertake R&D.In contrast,the government's adoption of appropriate penalties for power battery manufacturers is more likely to incentivise them to take the initiative to undertake the responsibility of R&D of recycling technologies.
作者
陈宇科
童欣
CHEN Yuke;TONG Xin(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Normal University,Chongqing 401331,China)
出处
《重庆师范大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
北大核心
2024年第4期68-83,共16页
Journal of Chongqing Normal University:Natural Science
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(No.72074035)
国家社会科学基金面上项目(No.18BJY093)
重庆市社会科学规划重大项目(No.2020ZDJJ01)。
关键词
动力电池再生利用
补贴激励
技术创新
演化博弈
power battery recycling
subsidy incentives
technological innovation
evolutionary game