基于政府监管的电商平台与商家隐私保护合作策略研究

Privacy protection cooperation strategies between e-commerce platforms and merchants based on government regulation

电商交易过程中,用户隐私泄露问题层出不穷。本研究在政府监管的框架下,探讨了电商平台与商家在隐私保护方面的策略互动问题。通过构建一个考虑电商隐私保护水平及其声誉动态变化的合作与非合作微分博弈模型,分析不同情形下各方的最优决策,考察相关参数对最优决策的影响。研究结果表明:政府的奖惩比例、市场条件和收益关系等因素对平台的补贴策略有显著影响,也证明了补贴策略能有效激励商家增加在用户隐私保护方面的投入。在平台与商家合作的情形下,隐私保护努力仅受政府奖惩系数的影响。双方的合作协同消除了双重边际化效应,显著提高了整体的隐私保护水平和电商声誉,进而实现整体收益的最大化。

In the process of e-commerce transactions,users’privacy leakage problems emerge endlessly.Under the framework of government regulation,this study explores the strategic interaction between mobile ecommerce platforms and merchants in terms of privacy protection.By constructing a cooperative and noncooperative differential game model that considers the dynamic change of mobile e-commerce privacy protection level and reputation,the research analyzes optimal decisions of all parties under various conditions and discusses the impact of related parameters on the optimal decision.The findings indicate that factors such as the government’s reward-penalty ratio,market conditions,and profit relationships significantly influence the platform’s subsidy strategy,and this strategy effectively encourages merchants to enhance their efforts in privacy protection.Furthermore,the effort towards privacy protection in a cooperative scenario between platforms and merchants is only affected by the government’s reward-penalty coefficient.Simultaneously,the collaboration between the parties eliminates the double marginalization effect,and significantly increases the overall level of privacy protection and the reputation of e-commerce,thereby maximizing the overall benefits.