“省直管县”财政体制改革对县级政府举债行为的影响研究

A Study on the Influence of Fiscal System Reform in“Counties Directly under the Provincial Government”on the Borrowing Behavior of County-Level Governments

省以下财政体制是我国新一轮财税体制改革的重要组成部分。本文以我国省以下财政体制改革的重要创新实践——“省直管县”财政体制改革为对象,利用手工整理的2008-2019年1677个县级行政单位“省直管县”财政体制改革数据和县级政府债务数据,采用准自然实验方法和构建多期DID模型,实证分析“省直管县”财政体制改革对县级政府举债的影响。研究发现,改革显著刺激了县级政府举债行为。经过一系列稳健性检验和内生性讨论后该结论依然成立。机制分析发现,改革通过缓解县级财政压力、强化被救助预期、削弱被监督约束三重机制发挥作用。异质性分析发现,改革效果与省-县经济实力、省级政府救助资源的自主性与可控性、财政透明度与审计监督效率等密切相关。本文首次揭示了省以下财政分权改革影响县级政府举债行为的逻辑与证据,不仅为现阶段完善我国多层级政府间财政关系提供决策参考,也为建立防范化解地方债务风险长效机制提供政策启示。

Under the multi-level government system of a large country,deepening the reform of the fiscal and taxation system needs to deal with not only the relationship between the central and provincial finance,but also the fiscal relationship between the provincial and sub-provincial governments.As an important innovative practice of fiscal system reform below the provincial level,the reform in counties directly under the provincial government has been implemented for more than 20 years and is considered an important attempt to enhance the public service capacity of primary-level governments under the current conditions.Against the background of a new round of fiscal and taxation system reform,it is of great significance to deeply study the economic impact of the aforesaid reform and learn lessons from it for deepening the fiscal and taxation system reform and modernizing the fiscal governance capability in major countries.Using the county-level panel data from 2008 to 2019,this paper empirically studies the impact of the reform on the county-level governments'borrowing behavior by using the staggered DID model.The study finds that the reform has promoted county government borrowing in general.The mechanism analysis shows that the reform plays a role through three mechanisms:Alleviating county-level financial pressure,strengthening the expectation of being rescued,and weakening the supervision and restraint.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the impact of reform on county-level government debt expansion is more prominent in areas where both provincial and county strengths are relatively strong,the scale of general transfer payments is small,and the degree of bank independence and fiscal transparency,and the efficiency of audit supervision are low.The marginal contribution of this paper is reflected in the following three aspects.First,it reveals for the first time the logic and evidence that the fiscal decentralization reform below the provincial level affects the borrowing of county-level governments.Second,it identifies the three mechanisms via which the reform affects county-level government borrowing:the pressure mechanism,the incentive mechanism(expected to be rescued),and the constraint mechanism(constrained by supervision).Third,it conducts rich heterogeneity tests from the aspects of provincial-county economic strength,autonomy and controlability of provincial government rescue resources,fiscal transparency,and audit supervision efficiency.This paper has the following policy recommendations.First,to deepen the reform of the fiscal system below the provincial level,policymakers should choose different decentralization strategies based on the development levels of different regions and the conditions of cities and counties.Second,reducing the fiscal hierarchy is a systematic project that requires overall consideration of the powers,expenditure responsibilities,and financial resources of local governments.Third,delegating power and strengthening constraints should be coordinated.At the same time,the development of digital finance and information technology needs to be accelerated,and a coordinated supervision mechanism for local debt should be promoted.Fourth,the performance appraisal system needs to be further improved.The research on the reform's impact primarily focuses on city and county governments,but could potentially extend to enterprises inthe future.