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演化博弈视角下的环境风险规制多主体策略研究

A Study on Multi-stakeholder Strategies in Environmental Risk Regulation from An Evolutionary Game Perspective
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摘要 通过构建多方主体演化博弈模型,探讨了政府、环保组织和企业在环境风险监管体系中的互动关系及策略选择过程。研究表明,三方主体的策略选择具有显著的交互性。政府的决策参数,如财政预算、环境污染指数、环境保护补贴金额和罚款金额,直接影响三方策略选择;环保组织的决策受维权成本、公众社会支持、社会声誉损失、媒体曝光率、资金状况和企业环保投资比例等参数影响;企业的决策主要受生产成本、预期收益、社会负面效应、投机成本、市场竞争力和技术创新能力等参数影响。通过优化政府政策、降低环保组织维权成本和提升企业环保投资,可以构建更有效的环境监管机制,推动可持续发展。 This study constructed an evolutionary game model involving multiple stakeholders to explore the interaction and strategic choices among the government,environmental organizations,and enterprises within the environmental risk regulation system.The results indicate significant interactivity in the strategic choices of the three parties.Government decisions,such as fiscal budgets,pollution indices,environmental protection subsidies,and fines,directly influence the strategies of all three stakeholders.Environmental organizations' decisions are affected by factors such as the cost of rights protection,public support,social reputation loss,media exposure,financial status,and the proportion of corporate environmental investments.Enterprises' decisions are mainly influenced by parameters like production costs,expected returns,social negative impacts,speculative costs,market competitiveness,and technological innovation capabilities.By optimizing government policies,reducing environmental organizations' rights protection costs,and enhancing corporate environmental investments,a more effective environmental regulation mechanism can be established,thereby promoting sustainable development.
作者 祝海霞 徐群芳 ZHU Haixia;XU Qunfang(Business School,Ningbo University,Ningbo 315211 China)
机构地区 宁波大学商学院
出处 《科技与经济》 2024年第5期81-85,共5页 Science & Technology and Economy
关键词 环境风险 演化博弈 监管机制 策略交互 环保投资 environmental risk evolutionary game regulatory mechanism strategy interaction environmental investment
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