“限薪令”背景下高管薪酬对国有企业绩效的影响研究

Study on the Impact of Executive Compensation on the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises Under the Background of the"Salary Restriction Order"

国有企业在中国经济发展中发挥着重要作用,为了鼓励国企高管更好地履行职责、提升企业绩效并确保持续发展,政府实施了“限薪令”政策。文章以2010—2021年的410家国有企业为研究样本,运用多元回归和双重差分模型,实证检验高管货币薪酬、高管持股比例和在职消费对企业绩效的影响,并探究“限薪令”政策对高管薪酬与企业绩效关系的影响。研究发现,高管货币薪酬和持股比例对企业绩效均具有正向促进作用,而高管在职消费对企业绩效产生了负面影响。进一步研究发现,“限薪令”政策增强了高管薪酬管制对企业绩效的积极作用。文章对深入理解薪酬激励机制具有一定的参考意义。

State-owned enterprises play an important role in China's economic development.In order to encourage executives of state-owned enterprises to better fulfill their responsibilities,improve enterprise performance,and ensure the sustainable development of enterprises,the government has implemented a"salary restriction order".The article takes 410 state-owned enterprises from 2010 to 2021 as research samples and uses the multiple regression model and the difference-in-differences model to empirically test the effects of executive monetary compensation,executive shareholding ratio,and on-the-job consumption on enterprise performance,and explore the impact of the"salary restriction order"on the relationship between compensation and enterprise performance.It has been found that executive monetary compensation and shareholding ratio have a positive promoting effect on enterprise performance,while executive on-the-job consumption has a negative impact on enterprise performance.Further research has found that the"salary restriction order"enhances the positive effect of executive compensation control on enterprise performance.This study has certain reference significance for a deeper understanding of the salary incentive mechanism.