摘要
菲尔丁的法律书写指涉启蒙时代英国法律之弊的两个层面:一是证据法的阙漏,二是正义标准的悖乱。这一书写暴露了经验主义法则之于证据认知的局限性,也洞见了英国法律与道德原则的割席。基于此,菲尔丁呼吁通过文学矫正法律之偏。他将“认知真相”的使命框定于人性探索之领域,论证证据认知方法在人类道德确定性领域的失效,为文学的认知功能而辩护。继而,他将识别“真假”的任务转换为区分“善恶”的论题,用诗性正义的内涵补充法律程序正义。面对经验主义的冲击,菲尔丁作为坚守诗学道德论的孤勇者,继承了“诗性正义”的文学遗产,开辟了不同于“形式现实主义”小说的写作新职域。同时,他的法律书写也通过道德哲学的正义实质烛照了英国法律形式主义之偏,成为了狄更斯时代法律批评的先声。
Fielding’s legal writing addresses two major flaws in Enlightenment-era British law:the deficiency in the law of evidence and the subversion of justice standard.His writing exposes the limitations of empiricist principles in the cognition of evidence and reveals the separation between British law and moral principles.Based on this,Fielding advocates for rectifying legal flaws through literature.He frames the mission of“cognizing truth”within the realm of human nature exploration,arguing that the methods of evidence cognition fail in the domain of human moral certainty,thereby defending the epistemic function of literature.Subsequently,he transforms the task of identifying“truth and falsehood”into the issue of distinguishing“good and evil,”supplementing procedural justice in law with the connotation of poetic justice.Confronted with the impact of empiricism,Fielding stands as a lone defender of poetic moral theory,inheriting the literary legacy of“poetic justice,”and opening a new domain of writing distinct from“formal realism”novels.Simultaneously,his legal writing,through the lens of moral philosophy’s substantive justice illuminates the flaws of British legal formalism,serving as a precursor to Dickens-era legal criticism.
作者
田津
Tian Jin(Foreign Studies,Three Gorges University,Yichang 443002,China)
出处
《外国文学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第5期142-154,共13页
Foreign Literature Studies
基金
湖北省教育厅哲学社会科学研究项目“亨利·菲尔丁作品中的法律书写与诗性正义研究”(23Q045)。