摘要
在多层级政府规制目标不一致以及构建亲清新型政商关系的背景下,作为强环境规制手段的代表,中央环保督察制度如何影响企业绿色创新行为有待深入探讨。文章构建了包括中央政府、地方政府、地方企业在内的三方演化博弈模型,分析在不同政商关系下中央环保督察制度不同阶段对企业绿色创新的影响机理和其扩散演化路径。并使用2012—2020年间我国A股上市工业企业样本数据,实证检验中央环保督察制度不同阶段对企业绿色创新行为的影响。研究发现:(1)中央环保督察的首轮环保督察和“回头看”两个阶段对企业的绿色创新行为均存在着显著的正向作用。其中,“回头看”阶段能够进一步促进企业的绿色创新水平。(2)中央环保督察的绿色创新效应在环境规制强度较低的地区和非国有企业中更加明显。(3)“回头看”阶段能够显著改善政商关系,促使政企形成亲清新型政商关系,进而有利于提高企业绿色创新水平。(4)中央环保督察通过影响市场竞争机制中的企业规模和进入退出两条路径对企业的绿色创新水平产生影响。文章的研究为进一步有效发挥以中央环保督察制度为代表的强环境规制手段效果提供了参考。
In the context of inconsistent regulatory goals of multi-level governments and construction of a cordial and clean government-business relationship,how the central environmental inspection system affects corporate green innovation needs to be further explored.Based on the sample data of A-share listed industrial enterprises in China from 2012 to 2020,this paper uses multiple-period DID and DDD methods to empirically test the impact of different stages of central environmental inspection on corporate green innovation.The results show that:(1)Both the first round of environmental inspection and the“looking-back”stage have a significant positive effect on corporate green innovation,and compared with the former,the latter can further promote corporate green innovation.(2)Enterprises in the traditional government-business relationship have limited impact on their green innovation by the first round of environmental inspection;while the“looking-back”stage can promote the formation of a cordial and clean relationship between local governments and local enterprises,thereby promoting corporate green innovation.(3)In the heterogeneity test of enterprise ownership,compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the first round of environmental inspection has a greater impact on the green innovation of state-owned enterprises;while the“looking-back”stage has a significant positive impact on the green innovation of non-state-owned enterprises,and an insignificant impact on that of stateowned enterprises.In the heterogeneity test of environmental regulations,the first round of environmental inspection has a significant promoting effect on the green innovation of heavily-polluting industry enterprises in areas with both low and high environmental regulations,and the“looking-back”stage significantly promotes that in areas with low environmental regulations.(4)The central environmental inspection has an impact on corporate green innovation through the two paths of enterprise scale and entry and exit in the market competition mechanism.In the long run,the central environmental inspection has a promoting effect on the expansion of enterprise scale and promote green innovation through the expansion of enterprise scale.In addition,the central environmental inspection may force enterprises that are unable to adapt to their cost pressures and undergo technological innovation transformation to exit the market in the early stages,and enable enterprises that meet green innovation requirements to enter the market;while in the long run,they cannot affect corporate green innovation through entry and exit.This paper provides reference for further enhancing the effectiveness of strong regulatory measures represented by the central environmental inspection system.
作者
孙鹏
黄锦辉
李杰
柳力群
Sun Peng;Huang Jinhui;Li Jie;Liu Liqun(School of International Business,Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China;Institute of Industrial Economics,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第7期95-110,共16页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72164008)
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(21JZD025)
海南省自然科学基金高层次人才项目(720RC578)
海南省哲学社会科学规划课题一般项目(HNSK(YB)20-13)
海南省院士团队创新中心项目。
关键词
中央环保督察
绿色创新
政商关系
演化博弈
双重差分
central environmental inspection
green innovation
government-business relationship
evolutionary game
DID