再融资新规的治理效应研究——基于企业杠杆操纵的证据

The Governance Effect of New Refinancing Regulations:Based on the Evidence of Corporate Leverage Manipulation

再融资制度修订旨在通过金融供给侧改革来缓解企业融资约束和加强资本市场监管,但其实施效果如何却有待深入探究。文章以2017—2022年我国创业板上市公司为实验组样本,考察了再融资新规对企业杠杆操纵行为的治理效应。研究发现,再融资新规的实施能够降低创业板上市公司的杠杆操纵程度。机制检验发现,再融资新规主要通过缓解融资约束和强化外部监督来抑制企业的杠杆操纵行为。异质性分析表明,再融资新规对“名股实债”形式的杠杆操纵行为的抑制作用更强,且在法治化水平较高、金融市场化水平较低的地区以及媒体关注压力较大的企业中对杠杆操纵的治理效果更好。文章的研究补充了融资制度变革抑制企业机会主义行为的经验证据,这不仅有助于报表使用者直观理解股权再融资制度改革成效,也为政策制定者及监管部门提升企业信息披露质量进而构建有效资本市场提供了重要启示。

The refinancing system reform aims to alleviate financing constraints and improve the capital market supervision system through the financial supply-side reform,but its implementation effect needs to be further explored.Whether the implementation of new refinancing regulations can inhibit the leverage manipulation behavior of listed companies,so as to reduce the financial risks of micro enterprises and prevent the systemic financial risks at the macro level is not only an important question that needs to be answered in deepening the financial supply-side reform in China,but also the key to measuring the effectiveness of the refinancing system reform.Taking GEM listed companies from 2017 to 2022 as the experimental group,this paper empirically examines the governance effect of new refinancing regulations on corporate leverage manipulation.It is found that new refinancing regulations can reduce the leverage manipulation degree of GEM listed companies.Mechanism testing finds that new refinancing regulations mainly restrain the leverage manipulation behavior of enterprises by easing financing constraints and strengthening external supervision.Heterogeneity analysis shows that new refinancing regulations have a stronger inhibition effect on corporate leverage manipulation in the form of“nominal equity but actual debt”,and the governance effect on corporate leverage manipulation is better in regions with a higher legalization level,a lower financial marketization level,and greater media attention pressure.This paper has the following marginal contributions:First,it enriches the literature on the relationship between the securities regulation system reform and the quality of corporate information disclosure,and provides new empirical evidence for a reasonable evaluation of the implementation effect of new refinancing regulations.Second,it not only adds direct evidence for investors to understand the motivations of corporate leverage manipulation,but also provides new insights into how the government regulate corporate debt information disclosure.Third,it identifies the exogenous conditions that are conducive to better playing the role of policies,and provides decision-making references for policy-makers and other stakeholders.