“非犯罪型腐败”的发生逻辑——基于我国省域“四种形态”数据的模糊集定性比较分析

The Occurrence Logic of"Non-Criminal Corruption"-A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative A nalysis Based on the Provincial"Four Form"Data in China

现有腐败研究着眼于研究犯罪型腐败,而忽略了同样重要的非犯罪型腐败。基于委托代理理论、日常活动理论构建“非犯罪型腐败”分析框架,研究发现,在我国的31个省级行政区中,非犯罪型腐败的高发还是低发均存在多重机制,不同诱发因素之间呈复杂互动,且存在因果不对称;非犯罪型腐败发生有五条路径:“机遇引诱型”“机遇引诱-监察缺失型”“薪资欠恰型”“透明-动机-目标互动型”“四维互动型”;阻碍非犯罪型腐败发生有五条路径:“被动清廉型”“监察抑制型”“透明抑制型”“透明抑制-高薪养廉型”“监察抑制-高薪养廉型”;对于非犯罪型腐败而言,委托代理-日常活动框架中的四个维度并不处于完全对称状态,其中目标维度的重要性要大于其他维度。

Existing corruption research focuses on criminal corruption while overlooking the equally important non-criminal corruption.Based on principal-agent theory and routine activity theory,a frame-work for analyzing"non-criminal corruption"was constructed.The study found that,Among the 31 pro-vincial-level administrative regions in China,both high and low occurrences of non-criminal corruption result from multiple concurrent mechanisms,with complex interactions between various triggering factors,and a phenomenon of causal asymmetry.There are five paths inducing non-criminal corruption:“oppor-tunity-induced type”,"opportunity-induced and supervision-lacking type","inadequate salary type","transparency-motivation-goal interaction type",and"four-dimensional interaction type".In addition,there are five paths hindering the occurrence of non-criminal corruption:"passive clean type","supervision in-hibition type","transparency inhibition type","transparency inhibition with high salaries for integrity type",and"supervision inhibition with high salaries for integrity type".For non-criminal corruption,the four dimensions within the agency-routine framework are not completely symmetrical,with the objective dimension being more important than the other three.