论股东功能之嬗变:从股东治理到股东代理

On the Evolution of Shareholder Function: From Shareholder Governance to Shareholder Agency

公司所有权问题是公司法和公司治理都面临的一个基础问题,关乎股东功能定位,也是股东治理重构的逻辑起点。在法人拟制说占据主导地位的法域,公司所有权问题表现为所有权和控制权的分离,这个观念在法人实在说流行的法域也被奉为圭臬。而随着股东对公司的所有者身份失落,两权分离的表述也逐渐失去合理性。股东不是公司所有者,也不是公司当然的剩余索取权人,公司的所有者正是公司自己,而股东实际上是公司的代理人,和董事处于同样的代理地位。传统股东的治理功能逐渐演变成代理功能。我国2023年修订的《公司法》对公司治理作出较多修改,拓展了董事治理空间,但并未弱化股东治理的重要性。在未来的公司治理中,应该采公司本位主义和利益相关者理论融合的治理模式。

The issue of corporate ownership is a fundamental issue facing both corporate law and corporate governance,and the function orientation of shareholders is also the logical starting point for the reconstruction of shareholder governance.In jurisdictions where the theory of legal person theory is dominant,the issue of corporate ownership is represented by the separation of ownership and control.This concept is also held up as a standard in jurisdictions where the reality theory of the legal person is prevalent.As shareholders lose their ownership of the company,the statement of the separation of the two rights gradually loses its rationality.The shareholders are not the owners of the company,nor are they the natural residual claimants of the company.The owner of the company is the company itself,and the shareholders are actually the agents of the company,and they are in the same agency position as the directors.The traditional governance function of shareholders has gradually evolved into the agent function.The revised Company Law of China of 2023 has made substantial changes to corporate governance and expanded the space for director governance,but at the same time,it has not reduced the importance of shareholder governance.In China's future corporate governance,a governance model that integrates corporate egoism and stakeholder theory should be adopted.