股东行政层级对商业银行风险承担的影响

The Influence of Shareholders'Administrative Level on Risk Taking of Commercial Banks

新冠肺炎疫情爆发以后,全球经济普遍受到负面冲击,银行的风险承担和风险缓解措施成为社会和公众高度关注的焦点。对商业银行股东行政层级与风险承担之间关系的实证研究表明,商业银行国有股权行政级别的提高对化解银行风险有积极的促进作用。当银行有更高行政级别的股东控股时,会缓解地方政府主导股权时银行的关联贷款问题,进而降低银行的风险承担;有更高行政级别的股东控股会提高银行的股权集中度,改善银行经营状况,减少委托代理问题,进而降低银行的风险承担。因此,应适当提高我国商业银行股东的行政层级,尤其是未上市商业银行以及经济欠发达地方的中小型城商行和农商行,这样可以有效控制地方政府股东对贷款的操纵行为,改善银行治理,促进商业银行进行风险化解和稳健经营,避免发生系统性金融风险。

After the outbreak of the novel coronavirus(COVID-19),the global economy has been generally affected by negative impacts,and the risk taking and risk mitigation measures of banks have become the focus of high attention of the society and the public.The empirical study on the relationship between the administrative level of shareholders and risk taking in commercial banks shows that the improvement of the administrative level of stateowned equity in commercial banks has a positive promoting effect on resolving bank risks.When a bank is controlled by a shareholder with a higher administrative level,it will alleviate the related loan problem of the bank when the local government dominates the equity,and thus reduce the risk of the bank.Shareholders with higher administrative level will improve the bank's ownership concentration,improve the bank's operating conditions,reduce the principal-agent problem,and thus reduce the bank's risk bearing.Therefore,the administrative level of shareholders in China's commercial banks should be appropriately raised.And especially unlisted commercial banks and small and medium-sized urban commercial banks and rural commercial banks in economically underdeveloped areas should do so in order to effectively control the manipulation of loans by local government shareholders,improve bank governance,promote risk resolution and steady operation of commercial banks,and avoid systemic financial risks.