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税收任务、征管裁量权与税收优惠落地

Tax Revenue Target,Discretion and the Ta ke-up of Tax Benefits
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摘要 税收优惠是否落地直接关系到减税政策的有效性,是税制体系设计需要考虑的重要问题。已有研究着重从企业层面讨论了影响优惠落地的因素,忽视了税务部门行为激励的潜在影响。本文的研究基于政治经济学视角,从税收任务这一我国税务部门的核心激励机制入手,讨论其对税收优惠落地的影响。在理论分析的基础上,本文基于2008—2015年间全国层面的宏微观数据,以小微企业所得税税收优惠作为主要的优惠政策背景,从实证层面考察了税收任务对于税收优惠落地的影响。研究结果显示:一方面,任务压力的存在显著抑制了税收优惠落地;另一方面,征管裁量权是构成上述关系的重要制度基础,裁量权的压缩显著弱化了任务对于优惠落地的抑制作用。本文的研究对于理解我国减税政策的效应,以及征管体制的长期改革提供了有益启示。 In addition to the general standardized tax system,the formulation of tax benefits for specific fields and industries is the primary means of conducting macroeconomic stimulus and industrial regulation by the government.In addition to the policy formulation itself,the extent to which tax benefits are taken-up is one of the keys to determining the effectiveness of tax benefits.However,in many developing countries,including China,the extent to which tax benefits are taken-up is generally low.Existing studies suggest that institutional transaction costs,information friction,and behavioral economics factors such as tax compliance are the three key factors influencing the take-up of tax benefits,but they overlook the potential impact of the behavioral incentives of the tax authority.In fact,there are stringent prior checking and approval processes in tax benefits,and the tax authority has broad discretion over many aspects of tax benefits.Obviously,if we overlook the role of the tax authority,the understanding of the take-up of tax benefits will hardly be complete.In order to promote collection efficiency,especially ensure timely and full collection of tax revenue,China's tax authority has implemented a performance evaluation system based on the completion of revenue targets for a long period.Under such a logic of action,any policy objective that conflicts with the completion of revenue targets will be disturbed.Taking tax benefits as an example,the implementation of tax benefits is formally at the expense of reducing the total tax revenue in the current period,and therefore,when the implementation of tax benefits does not constitute the main performance evaluation indicators,and the tax authority has broad discretion for tax benefits,strengthening the approval procedure and even hindering the reasonable take-up of tax benefits to a certain extent,so as to ensure the timely realization of the revenue target,will become the preferred strategy of the tax authority.Based on macro and micro data of China from 2008 to 2015,and taking the income tax benefits for small and micro enterprises as the main background of tax benefits,this paper examines the impact of tax revenue target on the take-up of tax benefits,and discusses the impact mechanism of discretion in detail.Empirical findings reveal that,on the one hand,the tax revenue target significantly affects the extent to which tax benefits are taken-up,especially when the revenue target derives a stronger pressure on tax enforcement,the extent to which tax benefits are taken-up will be significantly reduced;on the other hand,the limitation of discretion significantly weakens the negative effect of tax revenue target on the take-up of tax benefits,compared to the examination and approval system,the negative impact of tax revenue target on the take-up of tax benefits will decrease significantly when the filing system reform is implemented.After a series of tests,the above conclusions are robust.The contributions of this paper are threefold.Firstly,it expands and deepens research on tax revenue targets.Existing studies have primarily focused on the impact of tax revenue targets on the total tax burden,while lacking the exploration of the sources of changes in the tax burden at a more specific level.This paper takes the scope of discretion as the institutional basis and the take-up of tax benefits as the object of observation,which not only enriches the understanding of the specific behavior of the tax authority but also provides a more microscopic and specific perspective to understand the change of enterprise tax burden under the target-based tax administration system.Secondly,it expands research on the take-up of tax benefits.Existing studies have primarily focused on the logic of cost-benefit and information frictions from the perspective of enterprises'take-up of tax benefits,this paper examines the take-up of tax benefits from the perspective of the tax authority's behavioral incentives,and puts forward valuable policy implications based on the limitation of discretion.Finally,it enhances the understanding of the implementation of policy under multi-objective.In fact,multiobjective governance is considered to be an important feature in China's primary-level governance.This paper demonstrates the stylized fact of objective conflicts among different levels of government from the taxation dimension,and further provides policy implications to promote multi-objective synergy,which provides a new perspective for understanding the central-local relationship.
作者 田彬彬 张欢 林超 李文健 TIAN Binbin;ZHANG Huan;LIN Chao;LI Wenjian(School of Public Finance and Taxation,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;Research Center for Tax Governance,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;School of Finance,Renmin University of China;School of Economics,Zhejiang University)
出处 《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2024年第8期57-76,共20页 Economic Research Journal
基金 国家自然科学基金(72473157,71973153) 高等学校学科创新引智计划(B20084) 中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费的资助。
关键词 税收任务 税收优惠落地 征管裁量权 央地关系 Tax Revenue Target Take-up of Tax Benefits Discretion Central-Local Relationship
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