生鲜电商供应链企业社会责任分担策略选择研究

Research on Corporate Social Responsibility Sharing Strategy Selection in Fresh E-commerce Supply Chain

考虑由单一生鲜供应商和单一生鲜电商组成的生鲜电商供应链,针对批发价格契约下生鲜供应商单独承担企业社会责任(CSR)和供应链成员联合承担CSR,以及收益共享契约下生鲜供应商单独承担CSR和供应链成员联合承担CSR四种策略,构建Stackelberg博弈,分析企业的CSR行为对供应链成员的影响,通过比较进一步探讨供应链成员的CSR分担策略选择问题。研究表明:企业的CSR行为总能提高产品新鲜度,平抑物价,刺激需求,提高消费者剩余和社会福利;生鲜供应商承担CSR会降低自身利润,但增加生鲜电商的利润;而生鲜电商通过合理承担CSR,既能提高自身利润,又能增加生鲜供应商的利润;供应链成员联合承担CSR要比生鲜供应商单独承担CSR对需求的刺激作用更明显;供应链成员联合承担CSR且实行收益共享契约,在一定条件下既能提高生鲜供应商的保鲜努力水平,又能实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改善,但此时生鲜供应商不应盲目追求高收益分成。

With the internet penetration into daily life and the development of consumers’online consumption habits,fresh produce e-commerce has seen explosive growth.However,with the increasing growth of fresh e-commerce,Numerous actual cases show that the corporate social responsibility(CSR)of fresh produce firms is woefully insufficient.For example,the“Dingdong”platform was investigated by the Haidian District Market Supervision Bureau due to sellingseconds at best quality prices andunauthorized“repacking”for labeling.“Miss fresh”was frequently complained by consumers for selling expired food.To deal with the reality,the Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China,updated in 2021,states that food businesses must be responsible for customers and practice social responsibility.As a result,several leading Fresh businesses,such as Freshippo,J.D.Fresh,and Dilifresh,have been impelled to incorporate CSR in their supply chains.However,it is still unclear what are the effects of CSR practice on fresh supply chain members,and how can CSR be shared among supply chain members to improve supply chain performance.To answer the research questions posed above,a two-stage supply chain with a fresh produce supplier and an e-tailer is explored in which each supply chain member considers CSR in addition to profit.Stackelberg game is constructed for the following four strategies:The fresh produce supplier practices CSR alone and supply chain members jointly practice CSR are discussed separately under wholesale price contract and revenue-sharing contract.The four models are formulated and some equilibrium results are gotten.Then the effects of CSR levels on optimal decisions,profits,and consumer surplus are investigated.Finally,the optimal decisions,profits,and consumer surplus of the four models are compared and analyzed.The conclusions are also verified through numerical examples.It is shown that CSR behaviors can always improve the freshness of fresh produce,reduce retail price,stimulate demand,and improve consumer surplus and social welfare.It is also shown that the fresh supplier practices CSR can reduce its profit but increase the profit of the e-tailer,while the e-tailer practices CSR can improve its and the supplier’s profits under certain conditions.It is further shown that the supply chain members jointly practicing CSR has a more significant stimulating effect on demand than the fresh supplier practices CSR alone.Finally,the supplier and the e-tailer jointly practice CSR under a revenue-sharing contract,which can both improve the level of freshness-keeping effort and achieve Pareto improvement of supply chain members’profits under certain conditions,but at this time the fresh suppliers should not pursue high revenue sharing blindly.