摘要
海洋碳汇质押融资作为涉海企业融资渠道的重要补充,其发展前景广阔但面临多重风险挑战。为有效破解涉海企业融资困境,考虑政府的政策引导作用,提出“政银保”协同的海洋碳汇质押融资模式,并构建政府参与下涉海企业、银行和保险机构的三方演化博弈模型,运用数值仿真探究不同激励政策对市场参与主体策略选择的影响。仿真结果表明:(1)政府采取贷款贴息措施、风险补偿措施和保险补贴措施,均能对海洋碳汇质押融资市场参与主体的参与意愿起到一定积极作用。(2)贴息、补贴和风险补偿相结合的综合激励政策效果最佳。(3)在不同发展阶段应采用不同的政策激励措施:发展前期宜重点采取事后风险补偿政策,发展过渡期着重采用贴息和补贴相结合的政策,发展成熟期可仅对保险机构进行适当补贴。研究结论可为现阶段海洋碳汇质押融资发展的扶持政策提供理论参考。
As an important supplement to the financing channels of ocean-related enterprises,marine carbon sink pledge financing has a broad development prospect but faces multiple risk challenges.In order to effectively solve the financing dilemma of marine-related enterprises,considering the policy guidance role of the government,this paper proposes the"government,bank and insurance"coordinated marine carbon sink pledge financing model,constructs the tripartite evolution game model of marine-related enterprises,banks and insurance institutions under the participation of the government,and uses numerical simulation to explore the influence of different incentive policies on the strategic choices of the market participants.The simulation results show that:(1)The government's adoption of loan interest subsidy measures,risk compensation measures and insurance subsidy measures can all play a certain positive role in the willingness to participate of the main participants in the marine carbon sink pledge financing market.(2)The comprehensive incentive policy combining interest subsidy,subsidy and risk compensation has the best effect.(3)Different incentives should be adopted at different stages of development.It is preferable to focus on adopting ex-post risk compensation policy in the early stage of development.The combination of interest subsidy and subsidy policy in the transitional period of development,and appropriate subsidies for insurance institutions only in the mature stage of development.The conclusions of the study can provide theoretical references for the supporting policies of the development of marine carbon sink pledge financing at the present stage.
作者
郑慧
陈静雅
ZHENG Hui;CHEN Jingya(College of Economics,Ocean University of China,Shandong Qingdao 266100,China;Institute of Marine Development of Ocean University of China,Shandong Qingdao 266100,China)
出处
《中国渔业经济》
2024年第5期21-32,共12页
Chinese Fisheries Economics
基金
山东省自然科学基金面上项目(ZR2021MG016)
山东省金融学会2023年度重点研究课题“社会资本参与山东省海洋种业发展的引导政策研究”(2023SDJR29)的资助。
关键词
海洋碳汇
质押融资
政府激励
演化博弈
marine carbon sink
pledge financing
government incentives
evolutionary game