摘要
控股股东股权质押具有担保增信机制与引发系统性金融风险的两面性,而关系交易作为一种中国传统“关系信任”的交易模式存在“合作”与“掠夺”的双重性,考察两者的关系对于科学合理安排关系交易与股权质押具有重要意义。以2010—2022年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,以客户集中度表征关系交易,考察以下三个问题:①客户集中度的双重性是否影响股权质押行为?②影响机制是什么?③具有怎样的经济后果?研究发现:客户集中度与控股股东股权质押呈显著的倒“U”型关系。机制检验发现,信息不对称、代理成本与风险承担发挥了部分中介效应。经济后果检验发现,在关系治理情景下,控股股东股权质押降低了股价崩盘风险。研究表明,关系交易这种利益相关者共同治理模式具有极强的灵活性与适应性,在约束与监督控股股东股权质押私利行为上具有突出优势,科学合理地处理客户集中度与股权质押限制性规定之间的关系,能避免陷入关系交易失灵和股权质押限制“一刀切”的两难窘境,有利于推动资本市场实现长期稳定发展。
The shareholding pledge of controlling shareholders has two sides:guarantee and credit increase mechanism and systemic financial risk.The relationship transaction,as a traditional Chinese"relationship trust"transaction mode,has the dual nature of"cooperation"and"plunder".It is of great significance to investigate the relationship between the two for scientific and reasonable arrangement of the relationship transaction and equity pledge.Taking Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2022 as the research object,customer concentration is used to characterize relationship transactions,and the following three questions are investigated:①Does the duality of customer concentration affect equity pledge behavior?②What is the influencing mechanism?③What are the economic consequences?The results show that there is a significant inverse U-shaped relationship between customer concentration and equity pledge of controlling shareholders.The mechanism test shows that information asymmetry,agency cost and risk bearing play a part of the mediating effect.The economic consequence test found that the equity pledge of controlling shareholders reduces the risk of stock price collapse under the relationship governance scenario.The research shows that the stakeholder co-governance model of relationship transaction has strong flexibility and adaptability,and has outstanding advantages in restricting and supervising the controlling shareholder's private interest behavior of equity pledge.It can scientifically and reasonably handle the relationship between customer concentration and restrictive regulations on equity pledge,so as to avoid falling into the dilemma of"one-size-fits-all"dilemma of relationship transaction failure and equity pledge restriction.We will promote long-term and stable development of the capital market.
作者
林钟高
辛明璇
LIN Zhonggao;XIN Mingxuan(School of Business,Anhui University of Technology,Ma'anshan Anhui 243002,China)
出处
《安徽师范大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2024年第6期100-115,共16页
Journal of Anhui Normal University(Soc.Sci.)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“基于缺陷修复视角的企业内部控制风险免疫能力及其强化机制研究”(71572002)。
关键词
关系交易
客户集中度
控股股东股权质押
股价崩盘风险
利益相关者治理
relationship transactions
customer concentration
pledge of controlling shareholder's equity
risk of stock price collapse
stakeholder governance