社会风险融入公司治理下的董事合规义务——困境、重释与平衡

The compliance duties of directors with social risks integrated into corporate governance:dilemma,reinterpretation and balance

出于可持续发展的要求,社会风险的概念需融入公司治理,并凭借公司内部的源头预防优势来应对风险现实化后的公共损害。但传统的公司法及公司目的是以股东利益为导向,董事对社会因素的考量面临多元目标冲突和履职技术受限等困境。故要将董事的监督义务重释为“构建公司社会风险防范体系”的强制性“合规义务”,以公共利益为管理导向,在受托于公司的前提下,与忠实、注意义务并列成为信义义务的子集。董事应在履职中采纳ESG方法,通过设置董事(会)级别的领导机关和“预防、侦察、调查与补救”的类型化流程,缓解风险多元化和技术化的挑战。而专业判断规则与责任区分规则,有助于平衡义务强化下的后端责任,避免董事对合规的过度反应产生的经营懈怠。

The integration of social risk into corporate governance meets the requirements of sustainable development,relying on the advantage of source prevention in the corporate to deal with the public damage after the realization of risk.However,the traditional corporation and corporate law are oriented to the interests of shareholders,and the directors'consideration of social factors will face such dilemmas as the conflict of multiple objects and the restriction of duty-performing techniques.Therefore,the supervision duty of directors should be reinterpreted as the mandatory"compliance duty"of"building the company's social risk prevention system",which,with the public interests as the management orientation,falls into the subset of fiduciary duties together with the duties of loyalty and care.Directors should adopt the ESG method in the duty performance,and alleviate the restrictions from risk diversification and technicalization through setting up the leadership authority at the board level as well as the categorial process of"prevention,detection,investigation and remediation".The professional judgment rule and the differentiation rule of responsibilities help to balance the rear responsibilities under the strengthened duty,and avoid the business laxity due to the directors'over-reaction to the compliance.