选择激励还是功能建设?——政府创新政策与企业策略性迎合

Selective Incentive or Function Construction?Government Innovation Policy and Strategic Catering of Enterprises

随着创新激励政策的推进,攫取政策红利的策略性迎合行为可能会相伴出现,扭曲政府创新激励政策的真实效果。为了阐明我国产业政策面临的微观企业策略性迎合的现实挑战,采用文本分析技术对企业的策略性迎合行为进行量化,并结合我国产业政策转型的历史大背景,将选择性和功能性制度安排纳入统一的分析框架,探讨不同创新激励政策与创新主体行为模式之间的内在联系。研究发现:选择性与功能性创新激励政策对企业创新产出均能发挥正向影响,前者会加剧企业形式上适应创新,实质上对抗创新的策略性迎合行为,后者则能有效减少迎合行为;迎合行为的存在还会反向制约选择性激励政策的效应发挥,导致其政策意图偏离预期;进一步研究发现,存在策略性迎合行为的企业,更具违规倾向和寻求政治联系的可能。

In the current economic landscape,government innovation incentive policies play a pivotal role.They are aimed at fostering corporate innovation,accelerating economic growth,and enhancing national competitiveness.In theory,these policies should serve as effective instruments for igniting innovation.However,a key issue that arises in practice is that firms often engage in strategic conformity to meet the superficial requirements of policies,thus gaining policy dividends.This practice may lead to distortions in policy effectiveness,not only wasting valuable innovation resources but also potentially undermining the overall efficacy of the policies.The emergence of strategic catering is a complex outcome of policy design and implementation.Government innovation incentive policies typically require a delicate balance of multiple objectives to support various types and scales of enterprises while addressing diverse economic and societal demands.This provides opportunities for firms to cater,exploiting the incompleteness of policies to pursue their own interests.In response to these policies,firms may adopt adaptive strategies to meet superficial policy requirements,rather than committing to substantive innovation activities.Thus,the study delves into the nature,motivation,and potential impact of corporate strategic conformity behavior in the context of China's industrial policy environment.Text analysis techniques were employed to analyze innovation-related textual information in corporate annual reports to quantify corporate strategic catering behavior.Specifically,an identification mechanism encompassing two dimensions was designed:innovation information disclosure levels and the quality of innovation implementation.Strategic catering involves"embellishing"innovation performance with lower levels of innovation output,such as low-knowledge-content patents like utility models.The alignment of a firm's innovation performance with its innovation information disclosure level was assessed by analyzing its patent application activities.If a firm"talks more than it does"in terms of innovation,reflecting a speculative tendency in its innovation activities,it is considered to exhibit strategic cater behavior.The findings indicate that both selective and functional innovation incentive policies positively impact corporate innovation output.While selective incentives encourage a form of compliance that ostensibly meets policy requirements,they paradoxically intensify strategic catering behaviors that undermine genuine innovation.Conversely,functional incentives significantly reduce such behaviors.Moreover,the presence of these catering behaviors dilutes the effectiveness of selective incentives,causing a deviation from intended policy outcomes.Further analysis reveals that firms engaging in strategic catering are more likely to exhibit regulatory violations and seek political connections to gain undue advantages.