资金约束和交叉持股下低碳供应链的融资决策

Financing models of low-carbon supply chain under capital constraints and cross-shareholding

探讨资金约束与交叉持股环境下供应商主导的低碳供应链融资决策问题。考虑由供应商和资金约束的制造商组成的交叉持股供应链,构建了无资金约束、银行融资以及贸易信贷融资模型。在此基础上,给出制造商的融资决策以及供应商偏好的制造商融资决策,并探索了交叉持股比例、消费者环境意识等因素对企业经济和碳减排水平的影响。研究表明:贸易信贷融资能够实现碳减排和缓解资金约束的双赢,但资金约束的制造商始终选择银行融资确保获得更高利润,且随制造商持有供应商的股份比例增加,偏好更明显。供应商更趋于制造商选择贸易信贷融资,始终有为制造商提供贸易信贷融资的动机。无论哪种融资模型,供应商持有制造商的股份比例增加都使得“强者更强,弱者更弱”。银行融资下,制造商持有供应商的股份比例的增加,能够缩小利润差距,缓解利润分配不公。

This paper explores the issue of supplier-led supply chain financing decisions in a low-carbon and cross-holding environment.Considering cross-shareholding,this paper studies the supply chain composed of a well-funded supplier and a capital-constrained manufacturer.Three models of non-financing,bank financing,and trade credit financing are constructed respectively.On this basis,the financing models that the manufacturer preferred and the supplier preferred are given.Also,the impacts of the cross-shareholding ratio and consumers'environmental awareness on the economic performance and emission-reduction level are discussed.The conclusions are as follows.Trade credit financing can achieve a win-win situation of reducing emissions and easing capital constraints.However,the capital-constrained manufacturer will always choose bank financing for a higher profit,and the manufacturer increasing shareholdings in the supplier enhances its preference for bank financing.The supplier prefers the manufacturer to choose trade credit financing and is always willing to provide trade credits.Under the trade credit financing model,the manufacturer will not gain more decision power even if it has more shareholdings in the supplier.Under the bank financing model,the manufacturer increasing shareholdings in the supplier can narrow the profit gap and alleviate the unfair profit distribution.The supplier increasing shareholdings in the manufacturer will increase the supplier's profit,but will not always increase the manufacturer's profit.