非国有股东董事会权力与企业高质量发展——基于国有企业混合所有制改革背景

Board Power of Non‑state Shareholders and High Quality Corporate Development:Based on the Mixed Ownership Reform of State‑owned Enterprises

利用2008—2022年上市国有公司A股数据,实证检验了非国有股东董事会权力对企业发展质量的影响,并深入分析这种影响的作用路径以及异质性。研究发现,国有企业非国有股东董事会权力能够显著提高企业发展质量。进一步研究机制作用发现,非国有股东董事会权力能够通过促进企业创新和提升信息透明度来提高企业发展质量。异质性分析结果显示,在竞争性国有企业和管理层权力较低的国有企业中,非国有股东董事会权力更能帮助企业实现高质量发展。研究结果为混合所有制改革背景下国有企业非国有股东董事会权力的积极作用提供了有力证据,有助于企业实现高质量发展。

Using the A‑share data of listed state‑owned companies from 2008 to 2022,we empirically test the impact of non‑state shareholders′board power on the quality of enterprise development and analyze in depth the path of this impact as well as the heterogeneity.It is found that the board power of non‑state shareholders in state‑owned enterprises can improve the quality of enterprise development.Further research on the role of mechanisms finds that non‑state shareholder board power can improve the quality of firm development by promoting corporate innovation and enhancing information clarity.The results of heterogeneity analysis show that in competitive state‑owned enterprises and state‑owned enterprises with low management power,board power of non‑state shareholders is more likely to help enterprises achieve high‑quality development.The findings provide strong evidence for the positive role of board power of non‑state shareholders in state‑owned enterprises in the context of mixed-ownership reform,which helps enterprises achieve high‑quality development.