监管监管者:金融反腐败与隐性金融风险

Supervise Regulators:Anti-corruption and Hidden Financial Risks

有效识别金融风险是金融风险治理的前提,而监管腐败会使得金融风险不能被正确反映在监管报表之中,引发不为人知的隐性金融风险,这一重要关系尚未得到实践和理论关注。本文首先构建了一个包含反腐败部门、金融监管者和银行的多主体博弈模型,分析金融反腐败抑制监管腐败及产生的金融风险治理效应。之后,本文基于2012-2021年31个省级行政区的面板数据,对理论推论进行实证检验。结果表明,金融反腐败不仅抑制了事后“猫鼠一窝”引发的隐性金融风险,还进一步发挥作用,促使金融机构审慎经营,实现金融风险治理关口前移。此外,金融反腐败还能抑制金融风险的溢出。基于研究结论,本文提出,需高度重视腐败治理和金融风险治理的协同效应,通过加强金融反腐败,防止金融风险隐性化,提升监管治理金融风险的成效。

The effective identification of financial risks is foundational to the governance of risks,yet supervisory corruption can distort their accurate representation in supervisory statements.This distortion gives rise to hidden financial risks,a topic that has been neglected in both theoretical and practical domains.This study introduces a multi-agent game model that encompasses anti-corruption agencies,financial supervisors,and banks.Subsequently,an empirical analysis is conducted on the theoretical proposition using panel data from 31 provincial administrative regions over the period from 2012 to 2021.The results indicate that financial anti-corruption not only curbs the hidden financial risks triggered by the dynamic interplay between supervisors and banks but also fosters prudence within banks.This,in turn,advances the administration of financial risk governance,pushing its initiation to earlier stages.Furthermore,financial anti-corruption also mitigates the potential spillover effects of financial risks.Based on these findings,the paper highlights the importance of prioritizing the synergistic effects of corruption governance and financial risk governance.It recommends intensifying efforts against corruption to prevent the surreptitious escalation of financial risks,thereby enhancing the efficacy of supervisory oversight in managing these risks.