政企融资平台下中小农机制造商的融资决策与优化

Financing decision and its optimization for small and medium-sizedagricultural machinery manufacturers under the government-enterprisefinancing platform

基于政企融资平台的背景,以一个资金受限的中小农机制造商和经销商组成的两级供应链为研究对象,探究了中小农机制造商的融资决策和优化问题.通过建立供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,得出供应链成员在不同模式下的最优融资决策和最优值.结果表明:政企平台融资模式总是优于银行融资模式;银行融资模式下,产品成功率与利率和批发价格成反比,与订单数量成正比,且初始资金的变化不会影响均衡解;政企融资平台模式下,初始资金、产品成功率均不会影响均衡解;无论在何种融资模式下,提高产品成功率都会对整个供应链有益,并通过数值分析验证了结果的真实性.最后,探讨了政企平台融资模式的适用情境:初始资金和政府补贴较低,生产成本较高的中小农机制造商更倾向于选择政企平台进行融资.

Based on the context of the government-enterprise financing platform,this study builds a supply chain Stackelberg game model,explores the financing decisions and optimization problems of small and medium-sized agricultural machinery manufacturers and obtains the optimal financing decisions and optimal values of supply chain members in different modes by a two-tier supply chain of capital-constrained agricultural machinery manufacturers and dealers.The results show that the government-enterprise platform financing mode is always better than the bank financing mode.In the bank financing model,product success is inversely proportional to interest rates and wholesale prices,and proportional to order quantities.The initial funding does not affect the equilibrium solution.In the government-enterprise financing platform mode,neither initial capital nor product success affects the equilibrium solution.Regardless of the financing model,improving product success will benefit the whole supply chain,and the results is verified by numerical analysis.Finally,the context is explored in which the government-enterprise platform financing model applies:Small and medium-sized agricultural machinery manufacturers with low initial capital and government subsidies and high production costs prefer to choose the government-enterprise platform for financing.