考虑广义储能参与的多园区综合能源系统低碳优化运行策略

Low-carbon optimal operation strategy of multi-park integrated energy system considering generalized energy storage participation

针对当前多园区综合能源系统(MPIES)大规模建设实体储能可能带来的造价高、投资周期长等问题,将广泛分布的柔性电负荷、热惰性空调-建筑、电储和热储整合为广义储能(GES)资源进行统一协调调度,并针对不同利益主体园区在联合运行的低碳需求,提出一种含GES的MPIES分布式低碳优化运行策略。构建考虑改进的热电联产系统和GES系统的园区低碳运行模型。在此基础上,考虑MPIES能源交易中各园区的利益诉求,基于纳什议价理论构建碳交易机制下园区群体利益的合作运行模型,并运用交替方向乘子法对模型进行求解。提出一种可以解决各园区源-荷差异的能量共享策略和一种根据各园区能量贡献度进行非对称议价的利益分配机制。为了充分保证各园区的信息隐私,在各园区间仅交互有限信息的基础上达到博弈均衡。通过算例分析证明了所提方法在减少碳排放、提升个体和联盟效益方面的有效性以及GES参与调控的优越性。

In view of the high cost,long investment cycle and other issues caused by the large-scale con⁃struction of physical energy storage in the current multi-park integrated energy system(MPIES),the widely distributed flexible electric loads,thermally inert air-conditioning buildings,electric storage and thermal storage are integrated into the generalized energy storage(GES)resources for unified and coordinated scheduling.Additionally,a distributed low-carbon optimal operation strategy of MPIES with GES is proposed to address the low-carbon demands of different interest parks in combined operation.The low-carbon operation model of the park is constructed,taking into account the improved combined heat and power system and the GES system.On this basis,considering the interest demands of each park in MPIES energy trading,a coopera⁃tive operation model of park group interests under carbon trading mechanism is constructed based on Nash bargaining theory,which is solved by alternating direction method of multipliers.An energy sharing strategy that can solve the source-load difference of each park and an asymmetric bargaining mechanism for benefit allocation according to the energy contribution degree of each park are proposed.In order to fully ensure the information privacy of each park,the game equilibrium is achieved on the basis of the limited informa⁃tion exchange among the parks.The effectiveness of the proposed method in reducing carbon emissions,im⁃proving individual and alliance benefits and the superiority of GES participation in regulation is demonstrated by numerical analysis.